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Consumer Rights 
Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz• 
I. General Remarks 
Consumer protection is a relatively young field of public policy. 1 lt has 
developed with the 'ascendancy' of the 'activist' state, and has undergone 
substantial changes on its decline. Consumer protection today, however, 
belongs to a set of well-established policies and has even reached the 
constitutional level.2 
A. Approaches to Protection 
There are three approaches which determine the debate on consumer 
protection. These approaches remain the same notwithstanding the level 
of protection, and regardless of its national, European or international 
socio-legal context. They help to structure the debate on the pros and cons 
of a constitutional right to consumer protection. 
1. Rights 
Proclaiming rights in order to shape the normative structure of consumer 
protection encounters problems which are common to all 'social' rights. 
Tue endangering of rights stems to a !arge extent from the activities of 
The author wishes to express bis thanks and appreciation to Christianjoerges 
for his stimulating criticism and constructive suggestions. 
E. v. Hippe!, Verbraucherschutz, 3rd edition (1986); N. Reich (ed.) of a series 
of reports on Consumer Law in the Member States of the European Community; 
Th. Bourgoignie, D. Trubek, Consumerlaw, common marketsandfederalism 
in Europe and the United States (1987). 
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private actors and organizations. Tue state can only be blamed for 
facilitating such activities. A right must, therefore, be understood as a right 
to protection by the state which expresses itself through an imposition of 
duties on private actors. lt is common to differentiate two areas of 
consumer protection, namely the protection of economic interests and ehe 
protection of health and safety. Whereas the need to protect economic 
interests often remains controversial, according to widely held views, one 
should conceive of human integrity as a basic right underlying pertinent 
protective measures. 
2. State objectives 
Tue alternative to proclaiming fundamental rights is to lay down protec-
tionist objectives (Staatsziele). This technique may be considered as a 
means of avoiding the difficulties in relating legitimate objectives of 
protection to fundamental subjective rights. At the same time it may be a 
more adequate means of expressing public concern for protectionist 
objectives which do not seem to deserve the dignity of a fundamental right 
(e.g. economic interests of consumers). 
3. Procedural rights 
One common aspect of consurner and environmental protection deserves 
particular mention. Irrespective of the technique ernployed, the deline-
ation of protectionist measures will always have to be weighed against 
other concerns. The consumer's right to safety may be in conflict with his 
own economic interests. Granting rights or codifying state objectives will 
have an impact on the assessment of such conflicts, but cannot dispose of 
them. Because of this difficulty, one rnust question the degree to which 
rights should be shaped as 'procedural' rights (i.e. access to information, 
participation in decision-making procedures, consumer remedies and 
other forms of judiciary mechanisms). Tue three approaches to protection 
should not be understood as mutually exclusive. Each of ehern has its merits 
and its disadvantages. Tue final conclusion will assemble the different 
approaches and recommend use of each according to the various 
protectionist concerns. 
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B. Method of Presenting the Issue 
From the outset, the discussion on legal protection has been an interna-
tional one. lt is therefore possible to identify topics of international interest. 
Tue Community, however, stepped into the field of consumer protection 
relatively late. 3 Its task has concerned the further development of pre-
existing protection mechanisms and their adaptation to the specific needs 
of the Community. For an evaluation of the legal techniques employed 
thorough analysis, not only ofthe pertinent texts but also of their implemen-
tation, wouJd be extremeJy helpful.~ However, for present purposes, it 
suffices to describe the approaches used at the international, national and 
Community level and to evaluate the pros and cons ofthe various regulatory 
techniques. A close examination of the state of community policy and 
community law will form the core of our presentation. 
II. Protection of Economic Interests 
and the Right to Saf ety 
A. EEC Consumer Policy Programmes 
The notion of consumer protection in the Community has been shaped by 
the Commission in two Consumer Policy Programmes of 19765 and 19816 
and was recently confirmed in the 'New Impulse for Consumer Protection' 
(1985).7 According to these programmes, consumer protection covers two 
broad areas of concern: (1) protection against economic 'risks' as a 
consequence of unfair marketing practices, unbalanced rights and duties 
in contract terms, etc; (2) protection against risks issuing from dangerous 
products such as unsafe consumer goods, useless and insufficientJy tested 
L. Krämer, EWG-Verbraucherrecht (1985); N. Reich, Förderung und Schutz 
diffuser Interessen durch die Europäischen Gemeinschaften (1987). 
The analysis of consumer law is restricted to presentation of the regulatory 
techniques. There has never been an attempt to investigate the implementation 
of the different laws, at least not in a comprehensive way and not in a 
comparative and European perspective. 
O] (1975) C 92, 1 seq. 
O] (1981) C 133, 1 seq. 
COM (85) 314 final, 23.7.1983. 
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drugs, contaminated food, etc. Tue distinction drawn between economic 
interests and the protection of safety interests seems intuitively plausible. 
lt has never been questioned and may be called the hard core of consumer 
protection. The two Programmes as well as the 'New Impulse' require the 
Community to develop appropriate legal means for realizing both goals. 
Certainly, consumers are presented within the Programmes as parties 
enjoying 'rights': the right to protection againsteconomic risks and the right 
to safety. Tue two Consumer Programmes and the New Impulse connect 
these basic rights of protection with the necessary procedufal rights. These 
attempts guarantee their implementation through Community action by 
proclaiming both a right tobe heard and a right to consumer redress. 
Although the Programmes do not articulate precise details for the structure 
which consumer policies should adopt, they nevertheless reflect those 
difficulties which hamper the debate on consumer protection, i.e. whether 
it amounts to either 'human rights' and/or 'state objectives', together with 
its' relevance for 'procedural rights.' 
While the development of consumer protection was a response to the 
activist state,8 its decline during the last decade reflects a general anti-
regulatory tendency. 9 Tue first Consumer Programme of 1976 was adopted 
during the halcyon days of consumer protection. lt is based on the 
hypothesis that strong public action is needed to impose duties on private 
actors. Tue second Consumer Programme of 1981, however, sets aside the 
classical model of the activist state. lt relies rather on incentives for 
cooperation, on the corporate responsibility of undertakings and finally on 
'soft law' techniques substituting public interest intervention.10 A Third 
Consumer Programme has not been adopted. The New Impulse simply 
repeats the main issues and further develops the approach chosen in 1981. 
Consumer protection thus seems to have lost its priority. However this 
8 
9 
Cf. N. Reich, Markt und Recht (1977). 
H.-D. As.5mann etal., Wirtschaftsrecht als KritikdesPrivatrechts(1980); andin 
a European perspective the controversy between Ch. Joerges, Zielsetzungen 
und Instrumentarien der europäischen Verbraucherrechtspolitik: eine Analyse 
von Entwicklungen im Bereich des Zivilrechts, Zeitschrift für Verbraucherpoli-
tik (1977) 213 seq. and Krämer, 'Zielsetzungen und Instrumentarien der eu-
ropäischen Verbraucherrechtspolitik: Eine Entgegnung zu dem Beitrag von 
Joerges' Zeitschrift für Verbraucherpolitik (1977) 228 seq. 
10 With respect to the changing regulatory patterns cf. Ch. Joerges et al„ Die 
Sicherheit von Konsumgütern und die Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemein-
scbaft(1988) 282 seq.; with respect to the role and importance of soft law, Reich, 
Smith, 'Consumer Supplier Dialogue' 7 JCP(I984) 111 seq. 
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dedine nowhere lead to a complete abandonment of consumer protection 
policies, and it hardly affected the political commitment to protection of 
safety interests. 
Tue adoption of the Single European Act is very much in line with these 
general observations.11 Tue new Artide 100 A paragraph III explicitly rec-
ognizes consumer protection as a Community policy. Consumer protection 
has been introduced in the Treaty together with environmental protection. 
lt has not been put on an equal footing with environmental protection. 
Environmental protection has become a state objective (Staatszielbestim-
mung) ofthe Community,perArticle 130 R. Consumer protection, although 
mentioned in Article 100 A paragraph III, suffers from a double restriction: 
its realization is bound to regulatory activities by the Community aiming at 
the completion of the Interna! Market (Article 100 A paragraph I), and, 
according to the wording of Article 100 A paragraph III, the primary 
addressee of consumer protection is the Commission and not the Commu-
nity as a whole.12 Despite these weaknesses, it is no langer possible to 
question the competence ofthe Community in this field, at least not in the 
context of completing the Interna} Market. 
Furthermore, the core of consumer protection borders on environ-
mental protection. Article 130 R paragraph 1 explicitly states that one 
objective of environmental policy should be the protection of human 
health. Therefore, the right to safety can be incorporated into health 
protection through environmental policy, and may also be brought under 
the expansive and protective wing of environmental law as a constitutional 
objective of the EEC. In practice, Article 130 R must be made compatible 
with Article 100 A and a distinction has tobe drawn between health 
regulations relating to the completion of the Interna! Market and those 
health regulations relating to environmental protection. 13 Legal writers 
seem to agree that safety regulations relating to the achievement of the 
11 Cf. for an analysis of the Single European Act under a consumer protection 
perspective, Consurner Law Group, Consumer Protection in the EEC after the 
Ratification ofthe SingleAct 10JCP3 (1987)319seq.; N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, 
op. eil. (note 3), 296 seq. 
12 N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, op. cit. (note 3), para. 176, 297 seq. 
1
' Krämer, 'The Single European Act andEnvironrnental Protection: ReHections on 
Several New Provisions in Community Law' CMLR (1987) 659 seq.; Pernice, 
'Kompetenzzuordnung und Handlungsbefugnisse der Europäischen Gemein-
schaft auf dem Gebiet des Umwelt- und Technikrechts', Die Ven.ua/tung(I989) 
1 seq.; D.H. Scheuing, UmweltschutzaufderGrundlagederEinheitlichenAkte 
(1989) 152 seq. 
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Interna} Marker should be placed under ehe auspices of Article 100 A, and 
that Article 130 R should be referred to only in the case of genuine safety 
policy objectives.14 The choice tobe taken is not so much determined by 
legal argumencs as by strategic considerations. Tue Commission seems 
convinced that it is far easier to realize a 'high level of protection' under 
Article 100 A. This can be attributed to practical reasons , Article 100 A calls 
for majority decisions, whereas Article 130 requires, in principle, unanim-
ity. Although a potential conflict based on different concepts of the right 
to safety under Article 100 A (consumer protection) and under Article 130 
R (environmental protection) is far from finding a solution, one conclusion 
may be safely drawn: in legal terms the Single Act has strengthened ehe role 
and importance of consumer protection in Community law, especially in 
the field of consumer safety. 
B. A Constitutional Right to Protection 
Against Economic Risks? 
We began from the hypothesis that economic protection need notto be 
based upon some fundamental right. The primary responsibility for the 
protection of economic interests would then rest wich the Member States. 
European law would primarily be concerned with the abuse of national 
legislation for protectionist purposes (Article 30 ofthe Treaty).15 Pertinent 
secondary Community law could then be understood as providing a 
minimum level of procection (a European ordrepublic). The case-law ofthe 
EC] confirms the perspective that neither the Commission nor the Council 
are entitled to deprive the Member States of the discretion to shape the 
degree of economic protection within the limits of Article 30.16 Furthermore, 
the case-law of the ECJ regards consumers not only as passive beneficiaries 
of the Interna! Market, it also envisages an active role for the European 
consumer in the completion of the Interna! Market. The role is in principle 
14 Cf. L. Krämer, op. cit. (note 3); against N. Reich, op. cit. (note 3). 
15 Following the case-law of the ECJ on Artide 30. 
16 Cf. especially Case 205/84, [19861ECR3755 at 3803 n. 30 where the Court has 
recognized the necessity of supervising mass, or respectively consumer 
insurance as a 'particulary sensitive matter'; Case 382/87 [16.5.1989) where the 
Court has confirmed the Member States right to prohibit door-step-selling prac-
tices with pedagogic material. 
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equivalent to the freedom of undertakings to engage in European-wide 
activities.17 
Despite the emergence of such rights for the European consumer, it may 
in the long run be unsatisfacto.ry to have the prima.ry responsibility for the 
protection of economic interests lie with the Member States. Within the 
limits of Article 30, the different levels of protection would continue to 
subsist throughout the Internat Market. The 'state of origin' doctrine (the 
principle of mutual recognition or 'home regulation') is not capable - and 
not intended - to rule out such differences. All one could envisage would 
be an adaptation of choice oflaw rules to the basic rules of the Treaty18 and 
the European Convention of Human Rights. 19 
Under a constitutional perspective, however, one might be able to take 
a further step and explicitly recognize the Community's commitment to 
protecting the economic interests ofEuropean consumers (Staatszielbestim-
munlf>. This step would be in line with the European Parliament's recent 
declaration.20 Such a provision in the Treaty could serve as a yardstick for 
enforcing the 'best level'21 of protection through the market and eliminate 
the risk of downgrading consumer protection in the Community to the 
lowest common denominator. 22 
17 N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, op. cit (note 3), para. 14, 52, with reference to 
Steindorff, 148 ZHR(1984) 338 seq. and Donner SEW(1982) 362 seq. 
18 Cf. Steindorff, 'Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und deutsches Internationales 
Privatrecht - Ein Beitrag zum ordre public und zur Sonderanknüpfung zwin-
genden Rechts' EuR (1981) 426 seq.; Zweigert, 'Einige Auswirkungen des 
Gemeinsamen Marktes auf das internationale Privatrecht der Mitgliedstaaten', 
in Festschrift für W. HaJ/stein zu seinem 65.Geburtstag; E. v. Caemmerer, H.-J. 
Schlochauer, E. Steindorff (eds), Probleme des Europäischen Rechts (1966) 555 
seq.; Koch, 'Internationales Produkthaftungsrecht und Grenzen der Rechtsan-
gleichung durch die EG-Richtlinie' 152 ZHR(1988) 537 seq. 
19 Cf. Meesen, 'Kollisionsrecht als Bestandteil des Allgemeinen Völkerrechts: 
Völkerrechtliches Minimum und Kollisionsrechtliches Optimum', in Festschrift 
für F.A. Mann (1977) 227 seq.; Neuhaus, 'Der Beitrag des Völkerrechts zum 
internationalen Privatrecht' 21 GY!l(1978) 6o seq.; Engel, 'Ausstrahlungen der 
Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention auf das Kollisionsrecht' 53 RabelsZ 
(1989) 3 seq. 
w Art. 24 of the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedorns PE 132.563= EuGRZ 
(1989) 204 seq. Cf. Beutler, 'Die Erklärung des Europäischen Parlaments über 
Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 12.4.1989' EuGRZ(1989) 185 seq. 
21 Cf. in this context Zuleeg, 'Vorbehaltene Kompetenzen der Mitgliedstaaten auf 
dem Gebiet des Umweltschutzes' NVwZ(1987) 280 seq. 
22 What actually seerns to happen in the field of financial services, see BEUC's 
analysis 'Die Verbraucher und der Gemeinsame Markt für Finanzdienstleis-
tungen', working document of BEUC, BEUCIAGV/222/88 23.12.1988, Ver-
braucherforum Berlin, 30-31January1989. 
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C. Procedural Rights 
Strengthening the consumers' market position through participatory or 
procedural rights, might be conceivable and important for the protection 
both of economic and safety interests. Despite the recognition of proce-
dural rights in the Community's Consumer Programmes, no consistent 
approach has been developed for implementing the right to participation 
and the right to consumer redress.23 Surprisingly enough, procedural rights 
are more developed in the area of economic protection than in the field 
of product safety. This may be attributed to the settled tradition of 
protecting individual rights for consumers against overcharging, whereas 
procedural rights have only recently been detected as legal means for 
protecting safety interests.24 
Information policy measures are an essential requirement for active 
participation by the consumer in the market process and the development 
of market integration. This implies that a duty to provide information is 
imposed on manufacturers. Article 30 could probably be interpreted as 
guaranteeing a 'right' to information as a prerequisite for rational choice by 
consumers. ECJ case-law on the control ofMember States legislation seems 
to correspond to this view. 
Tue inclusion of procedural rights in secondary Community law is 
almost non-existent Article 4 of the Advertising Directive25 contains pro-
cedural stipulations tobe followed by national authorities or jurisdictions. Tue 
pre-draft Directive on Unfair Contract Terms provides for an equivalent 
regulatory mechanism.26 lt imposes a duty on Member States to take 
appropriate procedural action without specifying in any detail the potential 
role of the consumer. Consumers may be entitled to take a joint (dass) action 
as in the FRG, but they may be excluded from participation in the control 
of unfair contract terms where such control is left to the authorities.27 
Beyond these two areas, Community policy seems confined to in-
23 Overview on the state of development in L. Krämer, op. cit. (note 3) 389 seq. 
24 We will return to procedural rights in the field of consumer safety in more detllil, 
infra III. 
25 OJ (1984) L 250, 17 seq. 
26 Cf. GD XI/124/87 Further Draft Articles For Discussion on Unfair Terms of 
Contracts,June 1987 and COM (84) 55, final 9.2.1985. Proposal fora Commune 
Directive on consumer contracts COM (90) 322-SYN 285, 23. 7 .1990. 
Z1 Cf. for more details the CCC'l 76/85, COM (90) 322-SYN 285. 
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vestigation of access to justice mechanisms in the Member States,28 to the 
financing of pilot projects on consumer advice in selected EEC countries29 
and to evaluating conciliation procedures. 30 
In the field of consumer safety legislation and its implementation, 
consumers' procedural rights are more relevant by far. 31 Any 'right to safety' 
can only lay down general principles, e.g. 'essential safety requirements' 
which must then be specified by threshold values or safety Standards. A 
right to participate in decision-making procedures would have consider-
able implications. Tue same holds true for the implementation of pertinent 
legislation. Here again, the decisions tobe taken require complex value 
judgements. lt goes without saying that granting access to relevant 
information and participation in the assessment of risks would be 
extremely important One might even go a step further and raise the 
question of the extent to which consumers as individuals or consumer 
organizations should be entitled to bring safety issues before the couns, in 
order to guarantee that value judgments, safety standards, as well as 
regulatory actions tobe taken, might become the subject of judicial control. 
III. Community Policy Protecting 
the Safety of Consumers 
Tue overwhelrning importance of a consistent Community-wide safety 
policy seems seif-evident: an estimated 45 million people suffer from 
accidents at harne, and 80 000 of these accidents are fatal. 32 Even more 
alarming, 25 000 children die each year in the Communi~ due to accidents 
28 Bull.EG, Supplement, 2/85 Consumer Redress, Commission of the European 
Communities, Memorandum to the Council transmitted on 4th January 1985 
(basal on COM (84) 692 finaO. 
29 U. Reifner, M. Volkmer, Neue Formen der Verbraucherrechtsberatung (1988). 
30 Such a project ~ presendy being undenaken by Th.Bourgoignie, Universite 
Catholique de Louvain, Centre de Droit de la Consommation, 2, Place Mon-
tesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve. 
31 Cf. my paper, 'Considerations Shaping Future Consumer Participation in 
European Product Safety Law', in Ch. ]oerges (ed.), 'Workshop on Product 
Liability and Product Safety in the European Community', EUI Working Paper, 
Plorence (1989) 182 seq. 
32 Data taken from the EHLASS System, the European Accident Surveillance 
System, OJ L 109, 26.4.1986, 23 seq.; cf. Ch. Joerges et al., Sicherheit von 
Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 3) 289 seq. 
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at home. Most of these accidents result from suffocation, poisoning and 
burning. This section gives a survey of the Community's efforts to cope with 
consumer safety problems, and tries to illuminate the consequences of the 
Community's involvement in the regulation of product safety, with due 
regard to the Member States competence under Article 36. 
A. Safety as the Main Field of Recent Consumer Policy33 
Since President Kennedy's message to consumers in 1962,34 the right to 
safety has been neatly dovecailed into the mainstream of consumer policy 
objectives. Likewise the European Community in its two Consumer Policy 
Programmes of 1976 and 1981 has committed itself to 'an effective 
protection from dangers in the interest of health and safety of consumers.' 
However the implementation of the two objectives turned out to be 
extremely cumbersome. The first decade ofthe Community's safety policy 
may be described as incrementalistic and problem-oriented. 35 Tue Commu-
nity intervened whenever it seemed necessary to react to specific chal-
lenges. Quite a number of directives have been adopted, mostly related to 
pharmaceuticals, food and specific categories of consumer goods. 
Since the the mid-eighties the situation has changed dramatically. Tue 
programmatic objectives of the two Consumer Programmes became 
extremely important. 'Tue New Impulse for Consumer Protection Policy' 
of 1985 clearly demonstrates the shift in priorities. Tue Commission's White 
Paper36 seems to have paved the way for a new link between the 
completion of the Interna\ Market and the necessity to impose a general 
safety duty on manufacturers. The 'New Impulse' served as the basis for 
quite a number ofinitiatives and activities on behalf ofthe Community. Tue 
approach chosen might be characterized by four regulatory mechanisms: 
establishing a Community-wide accident surveillance system, imposing a 
general safety duty on manufacturers and dealers, developing appropriate 
33 The following is largely based on the study commissioned by the European 
Community, Ch. Joerges et al., Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10), 
cf. also Ch. Joerges, 'Product Safety Law, Interna! Market Policy and the Proposal 
for a Directive on General Product Safety', EUI Working Paper, EPU n. 90/3, 
1990. 
34 Reprinted in v. Hippe!, Verbraucherschutz, op. cit. (note 1) 281 seq. 
55 Cf. Krämer, 'EEC Action in regard to consumer safety, particularly in thefood 
sector' ]CP (1984) 473 seq. 
56 Cf. COM (85) 310 final. 
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control mechanisms to withdraw unsafe products from the market and, last 
but not least, imposing strict liability for defective products on manufactur-
ers, dealers and importers. 37 
The corner stone ofthe new consumer safety policy turned out tobe the 
elaboration of a general safety duty. lt cannot be explained without 
adoption of the so-called 'New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standards'. 38 Tue New Approach substituted the former Programme on the 
Removal of Technical Barriers to Trade of 1969,39 as amended in 1973.40 
This Programme departed from the idea that barriers to trade resulting from 
divergent technical provisions might be removed by way of adopting 
vertical, product-related directives. These directives should, according to 
the concept, lay down all the technical details manufacturers have to 
comply with in order to obtain access to the European market. But it was 
the necessity to come to an agreement on technical specifications that 
finally led to a deadlock. The Community organs, especially the Council, 
were all too often unable to agree upon the technical specifications. 
Proposals were discussed for more than ten years and the progress in 
harmonization was slow.~ 1 Therefore the Community had to reconsider its 
policy and finally adopted the New Approach in 1985. Its basic idea is to 
discharge the legislatory machinery of the Community from the necessity 
to agree upon technical specifications. 42 
The Community organs may now concentrate on laying down so-called 
'basic safety requirements' which will then be specified by technical 
standards developed by the European standardization institutions, CEN 
and CENELEC. Tue general pattern of the New Approach has been agreed 
upon in a model directive, which does not have direct legal effect but obliges 
Member States to adhere to its principles. Quite a number of directives and 
37 Cf. Micklitz, 'Perspectives on a European Directive on Safety of Technical 
C.Onsumer Goods' 23 CMLR(1986) 617 seq.; Falke, 'Elements of an Horizontal 
Product Safety Policyofthe European Communities' 12]CP(l989) 207 seq. 
38 OJ C 136, 4.6.1985, 1 seq.; cf. Joerges, 'The New Approach to Technical Har-
monization and the Interests of Consumers: Reflections on the Requirements and 
Difficulties of a Europeanization of Product Safety Policy', in R. Bieber et al. 
(eds), 1992: One European Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission's 
Internat Market Strategy (1988) 175 seq. 
39 OJ C76, 17.6.19691 seq.; cf. Ch.]oergesetal„ SicherbeitvonKonsumgütern, op. 
cit. (note 10) 250 seq. 
40 OJ C38, 5.6.1973 15eq. 
41 Cf. Ch. Joerges et al„ Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10) 272 seq. 
42 The regulatory technique of the New Approach is explained in more detail in 
Ch. Joerges et al., Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10) 341 seq. 
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proposals have since then been enacted. 43 Even at its initiation, it was 
already apparent that the policy of the New Approach needs tobe supple-
mented by a specific consumer safety policy. A general safety duty and the 
establishment of appropriate post-market control mechanisms at the 
Community level seem to be indispensable supplements to the new poli-
cies. This may be attributed to two reasons: (1) The new directives are 
shaped according to the needs of the specific product categories and 
specific requirements of the markets concerned. They are not based on a 
common safety concept; (2) Post-market control mechanisms are needed to 
avoid distortions to the Internal Market caused by measures taken by the 
Member States in order to protect their citizens against risks associated with 
dangerous products.44 
Tue consumer department of the Commission succeeded in preparing 
a communication entitled 'The Safety of Consumers' which the Council 
acknowledged and approved on 25 June 1987 .45 lt charged the Commission 
with the mandate of setting out a draft directive on a general safety duty. 
lt took another two years before the Commission published its first 
proposal. On 31July1989,46 a draft directive concerning general product 
safety was published. The draft as revised on 27 June 1990 stipulates in 
Article 3 that: 
Suppliers are under an obligation to place only safe products on the 
market Member States shall take in their legislation all necessary meas-
ures to ensure that suppliers meet this obligation. 
Article 2 defines what might be understood as a 'safe product' or a 'danger-
ous product' . 
.e Cf. for a closer analysis Falke, 'Normungspolitik der Europäischen Gemein-
schaften und Schutz von Verbrauchern und Arbeitnehmern', in Th. Eilwein et 
al. (eds), Jahrbuch für Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaften (1989) 217 seq .. 
"' Ch. Joerges et al., Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10), 451; the Jack 
of appropriate means of post-market control mechanisms has been the starting 
point for a follow-up study also commissioned by the Commission of the 
European Community, H.-W. Micklitz (ed.), Post-Market Control of Consumer 
Goods (1990). 
-'5 OJ C 176, 4.7.1987. 
'46 OJ C 193, 31.7.1989, 1 seq.; COM (89) 162 final - SYN 192, 7.6.1989, Proposal 
for a Council Directive conceming General Product Safety; as amended OJ C 156, 
27.6.19')0, 8 seq.; see for ananalysis Ch. Joerges (note 33); D. Hoffmann, paper 
presented at the EUI, Florence, Seminar 30.11. - 1.12.1989 on International 
efficiency of control decisions, adopted in order to ensure the respect of 
economic regulations by private parties in the EC. 
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'Safe product' shall mean any product which, during its foreseeable time 
of use, does not present any risk or only those reduced to such a level, 
taking account of the products use, considered as acceptable and 
consistent with a high standard of protection for the safety and health of 
persons 
- given its composition, execution, wrapping, presentation and label-
ling, conditions of assembly, maintenance or disposal, instructions for 
handling and use and its direct or indirect effect upon or in combination 
with other products, 
- when used for its intended use or in a manner which may reasonably 
be foreseen, having regard, interalia, to any specific statement made by 
its supplier or on his behalf in that respect and, in particular, to the 
normal behaviour of children. 
Tue feasibility of obtaining higher levels of safety or the availability of 
other products presenting a lesser degree of risk shall not constitute 
grounds for considering a product to be 'not safe' or 'dangerous'. 
'Dangerous product' shall mean any product which does not meet the 
definition of 'safe product' according to point (b) of the present Article. 
lt is not yet clear and certainly premature to predict the further destiny of the 
draft directive. One thing, however, seems definite: the draft wi11 meet with 
strong opposition from some Member States, most notably the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
B. Mechanisms for Safety Regulation 
at the European Level 
The programmatic policy objectives of the two Consumer Programmes and 
especially the New Impulse have led to a 'juridification' of consumer safety. 
The legal rules chosen by the Community recognize, in principle, public 
responsibility for protecting the consumer agajnst health hazards. As a 
matter of regulatory technique, this is brought about through special 
directives, graded according to the hazard potential, for medicines, pesti-
cides, chemicals and other consumer goods.47 Access to markets therefore 
-0 For more details cf. L. Krämer, op. eil. (note 3), 215 seq. with reference to the 
different product categories 234 seq.; cf. N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, op. eil. 
(note 3), 219 seq. 
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depends on quite different prerequisites. Medicines are subject to a prior 
approval procedure. 48 They may be brought into circulation only after a 
sophisticated statutory examination. Chemicals rnay be marketed through-
out the Community once they have been registered with one of the Member 
States' competent authorities. The statutory authorities do not exercise any 
direct control, they are merely obliged to register the new chemicals and file 
the documents presented by the producers. 49 Consumer goods must un-
dergo neither a prior approval nor a prior registration procedure. Market 
access is guaranteed once the manufacturers have ensured that their 
products comply with the basic safety requirements.50 According to the New 
Approach this might be done by reference to European, or, where these 
European standards are not yet in existence, national standards. Tue 
Community is considering the possibility of extending the New Approach 
to food51 and cosmetics. 
Tue procedure of setting protection standards differs according to the 
intensity of market access control. Member States authorities decide on the 
efficiency and safety of medicines. They have to rely on documents 
presented by the manufacturers, but they are entitled to undertake 
investigations on the specific properties of the medicines if this appears 
necessary.52 Tue situation is quite different with other consumer goods. Tue 
New Approach delegates governmental responsibility for protecting con-
sumers against health hazards to private standard-setting bodies, namely 
CEN and CENELEC. Operating from the basic safety requirements, CEN and 
CENELEC have to develop the technical standards which then guarantee 
manufacturers' access to the European market. Privatization of consumer 
safety is somewhat compensated for by democratizing the standard-setting 
48 For more details cf. N. Reich (ed.), 7be Europeanisation of the Pharmaceuticai 
Market- Cbances and Risles (1988); D. Hart et al., Das Recht des Arzneimit-
telmarletes (1988); N. Reich, Arzneimittelregelung in Frankreich (1988). 
49 Cf. L. Krämer, op. cit. (note 3), 245 seq.; N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, op. cit. 
(note 3) 242 seq. 
50 Cf. Ch. joerges et al., Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10), with 
reports on product safety law in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
51 COM (85) 003 final, 8.11.1985; the Community has not yet developed any 
proposal to implement that policy. The most recently published Directive on 
Food Additives relies on prior approval to guarantee access to the European 
market, OJ L 40, 11.2.1989, 27 seq. 
52 Cf. forthesituation in the FRG, D. Hart etal., op.cit. (note 48) 41 seq.; on Fraoce, 
cf. N. Reich, op. cit. (note 48) 25 seq. 
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procedure.53 Tue collaboration agreement between the Commission and 
CEN/CENELEC includes a provision on the participation of interests 
working in that field. 54 The Commission furthermore agreed to 'contribute 
to the ascertainment of suitable arrangements according to the circum-
stances.' This acknowledges a right to participation, which is not a feature 
of the prior approval procedure for medicines, and the prior registration 
procedure for chemicals. Redress does exist, but only for the manufacturers 
as addressees of the statutory regulatory activities. Consumers have no 
opportunity to bring a prior approval decision or a specific technical safety 
standard before the courts. 
Tue Community departs from the idea of shared powers between it and 
the Member Stares. Secondary Community law aims at harmonizing market 
access rules and at developing appropriate control activities. The task of 
enforcing harmonized rules lies with the competent Member States' 
national authorities. Implementation of a Community-wide safety policy 
therefore depends on cooperation between the different Member States' 
authorities with the Community. · This is implemented in the form of 
different committees which are set up along the line of the adoption of 
specific product-related directives.55 These committees, consultative in 
nature, might be understood as a first step to the final setting-up of an EEC 
administration in the field of product safety.56 In the Jong run it may be 
indispensable for delegating administrative powers from the Member 
States to the Community. 
s~ Cf. Micklitz, 'Produktsicherheit und technische Normung in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft', in K. Tonner, H. Paetow (eds), Wirtschaftsregulierung in der 
Krise, Jahrbuch für Sozialökonomie und GeselJschaftstheorie 0986) 109 seq. 
54 Reprinted in 64 DIN-Miu. (1985) 78 seq.; cf. Ch. Joerges et al„ Sicherheit von 
Konsumgütern, op. eil. (note 10) 403 seq. 
ss Cf. Meng, 'Die Neuregelung der EG-Verwaltungsausschüsse - Streit um die 
Comitologie' 48 ZaöRV(1988) 208 seq. 
S6 Cf.]. Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht, Entstehung und Entwicklung 
im Rahmender Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 2 Volumes (1988), the Commis-
sion indicates in the recitals of the amended draft directive on product safety 
(note 46) that it is willing to explore the possibility of setting up a non-statutory 
advi_sory committee, under its own authority, to represent the various interested 
part1es. 
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C. The Community's Involvement in Product Safety 
There is no escaping the reality that wherever the Community harmonizes 
provisions on product safety in the interests of achieving the Inrernal 
Market, it is thereby taking on powers in the field of product safety.57 The 
preemption doctrine ensures the Community's prominence wherever and 
whenever it adopts secondary Community safety regulation. The political 
consequences of the ever-broadening consumer safety policy were hardly 
noticed while the Community's approach to safety regulation remained 
product-related and incremental. A possible adoption ofthe Product Safety 
Directive58 would intensify the conflict between the Member States and the 
Community's regulatory competence in the field of safety. The division of 
power thereby gains a new quality. Does public responsibility for product 
safety lie primarily with the Community once the Directive is adopted? 
1. The Draft Directive on Product Safety and Article 36 
Article 36 recognizes public responsibility for consumer protection against 
health hazards as a possible defence for Member States against the predomi-
nantly Interna} Market objectives of the Commission. 59 Once the Member 
States have agreed to delegate specific powers to the Community through 
adopting product-related directives, they can no longer invoke Article 36. 
The scope ofthe Community's power will then depend on the character of 
the directive concerned, that is, whether the harmonization of product 
safety in the specific field is total or restricted. 6o 
Unlike its provisions on environmental protection, the Single Act does 
not entitle the Member States to introduce more stringent protective 
measures once the Community has acquired competence. Article 100 A 
paragraph N provides only for a specific safeguard procedure which the 
Member States might make use of, if they feel that the Community rules do 
not sufficiently protect their citizens. Despite the lack of a specific provision 
s7 Cf. Ch. joerges, op. cit. (note 38) 179 seq. 
58 Op.cit. (note 46). 
59 Cf. N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, op. cit. (note 3), paras. 120, 227-229 and paras. 
176, 301. 
6o At this point the whole body of the ECJ on the relationship between Articles 30 
and 36 needs tobe considered; cf. N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, op. cit. (note 3), 
224 seq.; Ch.joerges, SicherbeitvonKonsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10), 318seq.; 
L. Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in tbe ECC under Articles 30 and 36 of the 
Rome Treaty (1982). 
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corresponding to Article 130 T, the safeguard procedure under Article 100 
A paragraph N constitutes a challenge to the classical preemption doctrine. 
lt strengthens the Member States' responsibility for the protection of their 
citizens and considers their reservations against a Community which 
concentrates too much on the achievement of the Internal Market. 61 Within 
the limits of Article 100 A paragraph N the Community cannot realize an 
EEC consumer safety policy without the cooperation of the Member Stares. 
lt is true that the Community may initiale an infringement procedure under 
Artide 169 as a last resort. But this applies only to those violations of the 
Treaty which rnight be classified as constituting an 'abuse' of the Member 
Stares' powers under Article 36, in connection with Article 100 A paragraph 
IV. Legal doctrine already discusses the extent to which an understanding 
of the Community's and the Member States' power as joint or parallel com-
petence rnight be feasible. 62 This interpretation would indicate that the pre-
emption doctrine cannot be applied strictosensu to Article 36. lt rnight faci-
litate the adoption of the Draft Directive on Product Safety63 under Article 
100 A, whilst retaining the Member States' competence under Article 36. 
2. Harmonization of product safety and the function of the safeguard 
procedures already provided for in virtually all product-related directives 
Tue inclusion of a safeguard procedure in specific product-related direc-
tives alters the character of the public responsibility for protection of 
consumers against health hazards. lt transforms the right to safety from a 
right to defence by Member States against predominantly Interna! Market 
objectives, to a positive obligation of the Member States to safeguard the 
interests of their citizens in the underlying procedure. 64 Specific safeguard 
61 Cf. N. Reich, Diffuse lnterssen, op. eil. (note 3), paras. 176, 301 and Ch. Joerges 
etal., SicherheitvonKonsumgii.tern, op. cit. (note 10) 394 seq. 
62 Reich, 'Schutzpolitik in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Spannungsfeld von 
Rechtsschutznonnen und institutioneller Integration' 17 Schriftenreihe der juris-
tischen Studiengesellschaft(1988); Timmermanns, 'Common Commercial Pol-
icy (Article 113) and International Trade in Services', in F. Capotorti et al., (eds), 
Du droit international au droit de l'integration - Liber Amicorum Pierre 
Pescatore(l987) 675 seq.; Zuleeg, op. cit. (note 21); D.H. Scheuing, op. cit. (note 
13) 170 seq.; much more restrictively, Langeheine, 'Rechtsangleichung unter 
Article lOOa EWGV - Harmonisierung vs. nationale Schutzinteressen' EuR 
(1988) 235 seq. 
63 Op.cit. (note 46). 
64 a. Ch. joerges, Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10) 394 seq. and 
Hoffmann, 'La directive securite generale des produits et les articles 30/30 du 
traite', Interna! Document of DG XI (1989). 
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procedures belang to the core of regulatory mechanisms in safety-related 
directives. They follow more or less the same scheme and pursue the very 
same function. Safeguard procedures are set up in order to respond to 
objections from Member States against Community safety policy and to 
adapt the different national safety provisions to a common Community 
standard. lt is a common characteristic of all safeguard procedures that the 
Cocnmission claims the ultimate right to decide on emerging conflicts 
between the Member States concerning product safety, or between the 
Member States and the Community. This perception still goes hand in hand 
with the overall concept of the preemption doctrine. lt ignores, however, 
that the preemption doctrine does not apply in safeguard procedures 
provided for under secondary Community law. Here, consensus between 
the Commission and the Member States is needed, otherwise the Council 
will have to resolve the conflict. 
The retreat from the preemption doctrine at issue, does not constitute 
the real problem with safeguard procedures. Tue question is much more, 
whether the safeguard procedure by its very nature can fulfill its twofold 
function, especially as it is increasingly overcharged with quite heteroge-
neous tasks. This is especially true of the New Approach, where overcharg-
ing is the result of the Community's new concept in tackling the problem 
of product safety. Tue New Approach provides for the possibility of 
invoking the safeguard procedure, not only in order to debate existing 
safety standards but also to renew and upgrade European standards 
already agreed upon. Tue safeguard procedure also contains the elements 
of a second, and increasingly significant development - the so-called post 
market control mechanisms. 
Public access to experience with the safeguard procedures is limited,65 
but the policy of the Community is quite clear. lt relies on the safeguard 
procedure to solve all conflicts which are not yet clarified in the Directive 
itself. Theo, however, the safeguard procedures become the true organs 
which administer product safety at the Community level. Tue conse-
quences are far-reaching: they determine the degree to which the 
Community is involved in Community-wide product safety regulation. Tue 
criteria laid down in the specific directives then decide on the existence of 
a Community responsibility for the protection of consumers against health 
hazards. Finally, one might raise the question whether, and to what extent, 
65 Reports of the a.~tivities ar~ published, but not systematically and rather 
delayed; cf. L. Kramer, op. cit. (note 3). 
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such basic procedures need additional 'public control.' lt is conceivable 
that important issues of European product safety are being dealt with in 
procedures which are not subject to any kind of democratic control. 66 
3. Harmonization of product safety and the growing importance of post 
market control mechanisms at the EEC level 
Tue Community's consumer product safety policy tends to split up compe-
tences under the safeguard procedure. The task of co-ordinating the with-
drawal of unsafe products from the market is removed from the safeguard 
procedure and placed under the auspices of specific institutional bodies. 
This development directly results from the harmonization of market access 
rules within the Community. Free circulation of goods can only be main-
tained if there are some kinds of mechanisms available, which allow the 
Member States and the Community to agree on a common approach for 
withdrawing unsafe products from the EEC market. This task definitely falls 
outside the scope ofthe classical safeguard procedure. The Community is 
making efforts to build up post market control mechanisms in the field of 
medicines and consumer goods which, though differing in substance go 
beyond the Rapid Exchange System as adopted in 1984.67 Whereas the 
Community intends to establish a Community Food and Drug Administra-
tion, 68 it shows more reluctance in the field of other ordinary consumer 
goods. Tue Dran Directive on Product Safety would empower the Commis-
sion as the final and sole arbiter to take action if it has knowledge of 'a gra ve 
and immediate risk related, directly or indirectly, to the safety properties of 
a product.'69 To date, two mechanisms are to be found in existing safety 
directives, yet the overall objective of the Community seems clear. Post 
market control mechanisms need to become a subject of Community law. 
Tue scope of Community power to regulate product safety would then 
depend on, firstly, the criteria under which the Commission would be 
66 Cf. my 'Considerations„.', op. cit. (note 31), which explicitly aim at discussing 
participation of public interests groups in the post market control procedure. 
61 OJ L 70, 13.3.1984, 16seq.; cf. Ch.Joerges eta/., Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, 
op. cit. (note 10), 293; and with specific regard to the deficiencies, Falke, 'What 
should be the Content of an E.E.C. Directive on the Safety of Technical 
Consumer Goods?' 16 BEUC !.egal News (Nov./Dec.) 16 seq. 
68 Memorandum sur Je systeme futur d'autorisation des rnedicaments dans Ja 
Communaute europeenne, III/B/6, Avril 1989. 
(H Article 8 ofthe proposal for a Council Directive concerning Product Safety, op. 
ctt. (note 46), as amended. 
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entitled to take action at the Community level and, secondly, the Member 
States' willingness to cooperate with the Community, or respectively the 
Commission to enforce the measures taken by the latter. 
IV. Fundamental Right to Safety -
State of Development 
The concept of a consistent European consumer safety po/icyis in the offing. 
Consumer law, however, falls far behind the policy objectives. Tue follow-
ing chapter deals with the state of development of a right to safety within the 
Community, within the Member States and at the international level. 
A. The State of Community Law on a Right to Safety 
Tue Treaty ofRome clearly shapes the distribution of competence between 
the Member States and the Community in the regulation of product safety. 
Tue Single European Act has not amended the distribution of competence. 
Safety remains a public responsibility in the hands of the Member States as 
lang as the Member States have not decided to transfer their regulatory 
power to Community level. That being so, it does not suffice to look merely 
at the provisions of the Treaty. ECJ case-law is the main indicator in a 
preliminary assessment of the present state of a safety-right development. 
1. Right to safety 
Tue main consideration is whether, and to what extent, a 'right to safety' 
enjoyed by European consumers, corresponds to present governmental 
responsibility for protecting consumers against health hazards. One might 
see the ECJ, in its case-law on the relationship between Articles 30 and 36 
and the principle of proportionality, as being on the way to framing a 
positive obligation for the Member States to protect consumers against 
health hazards.70 Such a perspective would de facto anticipate the 
consequence of the safeguard procedure. Article 36 would no longer be 
merely a right to defence for Member States against Community action 
70 This was first conceived by N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, op. cit. (note 3), paras. 
120, 227-229. 
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neglecting or violating their safety interests. The result would border the 
constitutions in most of the Member States, where the governments' 
obligation to protect their citizens against health hazards could be 
understood as a constitutional responsibility. But we would like to go even 
a step further, and raise the question of the extent to which, under more 
extensively developed Community law, consumers might refer to a right 
to safety and require appropriate action from 'their' Member State. Such a 
Community right to safety would and should Jead to common safety 
standards all over the Communily. This perspective could essentially be 
based on the transfer of principles developed by the ECJ under Articles 30 
to 36. Article 30 already gives manufacturers the right to require access to 
the European market, a right which is enforceable before the European 
Court of Justice. Tue consumers' right to choose is the counterpart of the 
manufacturers' right to market access.71 Here, one finds the elements which 
could provide a basis for the development of a right to safety under Article 
36. Article 30 is directly applicabie, its addressees are manufacturers and 
consumers all over the Community. Article 36, however, would mainly 
constitute a positive obligation for Member State governments to undertake 
appropriate means to protect their citizens. The primary addressees of 
Article 36 are the Member States and not the individual citizen. 
A Community obligation imposed on the Member States to protect their 
citizens against health hazards, cannot be comprehensive. lt covers only 
those subjects of consumer concern in which the Community has become 
involved by the adoption of secondary Community law. Tue actual scope 
of the Community responsibility on product safety depends therefore on 
the content ofthe different directives related to product safety. Today, the 
scope is widely scattered and mainly product-related. lt is bound to quite 
differing pre-requisites in the safeguard procedures and in the proposed 
post market control procedures. The scattered power of the Community 
has manifold consequences: it ultimately means that the recognition of a 
specific Community power in the field of product safety might be measured 
against the criteria set out by the ECJ in its case-law on the relationship 
between Articles 30 and 36. n 
71 Cf. supra note 68. 
72 Cf. Ch. joerges et al., Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10), 318 .)Cq.; 
L.Oliver op. cit. (note 6o). 
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2. Content of a right to saf ety 
When one contemplates the emergence of a right to safety corresponding 
to protection against health hazards by the authorities, it logically follows 
that the substance of the term 'safety' requires clarification. Neither the 
Treaty nor the Single European Act provides any assistance for a definition 
of 'safety.' The Draft Directive on Product Safety might introduce a 
definition which will come dose to the one given under the Product 
Liability Directive.73 Tue Treaty however, does not remain silent as to the 
possible perspectives of a Community responsibility on product safety. lt 
requires the Commission to pursue a 'high level' of consumer protection. 
Article 100 A paragraph III could become the legal corner-stone of con-
sumer policy within the Internal Market philosophy, if one succeeds in 
deducing from Article 100 A paragraph III. a rule which obliges the Com-
mission to implement a 'high' or even the 'best possible' level of consumer 
protection. 74 Such an interpretation might be backed by the case-law of the 
EC]. lt allows Member States to claim a high level of protection for their 
citizens and even a higher one than in the EEC exporting country.75 The 
development of such a rule is strongly linked with the understanding of 
Article 100 A paragraph III. One might argue that it addresses the Commis-
sion only and that the 'high level' or even a 'best level' of protection cannot 
be submitted to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. 76 The Treaty does not, however, 
prevent the choice ofa quite different approach. One could well read Artide 
100 A paragraph III not only as an obligation for the Commission to pursue 
a high level of protection, but also understand it as a basic rule which is 
open for judicial control initiated by the European Parliament.77 This 
reading would open up the possibility of taking ehe Member State with the 
best developed consumer safety law as a yardstick for the whole Commu-
nity. 
73 OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, 29 seq. Artide 6 reads as follows: 'A product is defective 
when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect'. Art. 
2 b)c) of the Proposal concerning Product Safety gives a definition which in its 
essence comes near to the general clause of the Product Liability Directive. 
74 Cf. Zuleeg, op. cit. (note 21). 
75 28.1.1986, Case 188/84, [1986], ECR 419; cf. Ch.Joerges etal., Sicherheit von 
Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10) 425. 
76 Cf. N. Reich, Diffuse Interessen, op. cit. (note 3), paras. 176, 297 seq. 
77 Cf. L. Krämer, op. cit. (note 13), 679 with reference to the European Parliament's 
Resolution of 9 Oct. 1986 on the admissibility of action by the Parliament under 
Article 173 EEC Treaty, OJ (1986) C 283/85 seq., see IV.3 below. 
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Neither the character of Article 100 A paragraph III nor the meaning of a 
'high level of protection' have yet been clarified. Any propositions there-
fore remain at the level of policy proposals or wishful thinking. 
3. Procedural aspects of a right to safety 
Rights to protection are worthless without the guarantee of appropriate 
procedures defining threshold values, safety standards and post market 
control mechanisms. The analysis of the consumer safety policy has made 
it clear that the Community has not yet developed a policy on procedural 
rights in the context of regulating product safety. The question might be 
raised on the extent to which it is at all conceivable that a system be 
developed, which shapes and defines Community responsibility on 
product safety, without integrating public interest groups and without 
providing for some kind of judicial review. 
There is one exception to be reported. The so-called New Approach78 
of the Commission recognizes in principle the right to participation. The 
rules chosen might serve as an example for other fields of product regula-
tion. The New Approach relies on participation by 'interested parties' where 
the privatization of the governmental responsibility requires democratiza-
tion of the Standard-setting procedure. The details are laid down in the 
Commission's official communication of 11 December 1987.79 lt concretizes 
general principles. The legal quality is therefore tied to the estimation of its 
worth. The Commission is urging for increased consumer participation at 
the national level, to ensure that consumer interests are injected into the 
CEN/CENELEC in the form of national representation. Taking this as a 
principle, it would be possible to institute consumer participation in all 
fields of consumer safety regulation wherever and whenever private stan-
dard-setting bodies are involved in the definition of product safety. 
The New Approach recognizes the necessity to develop European safety 
Standards. lt is therefore logical that the Communication deals with the 
participation of consumers at the European Jevel. But the way in which 
participation is to be realized remains open to speculation. Tue Commis-
sion seeks new discussions with CEN/CENELEC concerning the modes of 
cooperation. The Commission is theoretically free to take the initiative. In 
accordance with the Council decision, it has a political mandate which it is 
78 Oj C 136, 4.6.1985, 1 seq„ the rules are specified in the Agreement concluded 
between the Commission and CEN/CENELEC cf. supra (note 54). 
79 COM (87) 617 final, 11.12.1987. 
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carrying out only very hesitantly. The policy developed under the New 
Approach never considered necessary participation of consumers in the 
Standing Committee. In these Committees, Member States' officials are 
coming togethertodiscuss all matters concerning the implementation ofthe 
New Approach. Participation of consumers would then be limited to 
standard-setting procedure in CEN/CENELEC and excluded whenever the 
competent authorities discuss the adequacy of such standards or post 
market control measures. Indeed, consumers are not included in the vast 
majority of Committees, 80 which in fact pave the way for the formation of 
the EEC's own administration, be it in the form of pre or post market 
control. There are no exceptions to the rule that consumers/third parties 
have no access to proceedings negotiated there nor to information 
exchange. The only information, given to them or to the general public, is 
often delayed and incomplete. 
One might summarize that secondary Community law points towards 
the existence of a right to participation in private standard-setting proce-
dures, both at the national and the European level, but leaves its form 
undisclosed. We therefore return to primary Community law, to consider 
the questions which can possibly be resolved there, that is, whether or not 
concrete requirements an procedural form can be deduced from the case-
law of the ECJ. Renewed statements on procedural developments can be 
found in the decisions of the ECJ based on Article 30.81 The consequences 
of the consumer's role as a market citizen under Community law are still 
open for a controversial debate. The trends, however, are becoming clear 
already. Consumers, it should be recalled, can only exercise their right to 
choose and their right to freedom of choice if they have alternatives and if 
they are informed of their rights. Alternatives create obligations, which, in 
turn, means the retaining of a competitive market and absence of restrictions 
on the consumer. Information about alternatives implies demands on the 
producer or possibly the 'State', which have the goal of assisting the 
consumer in finding his way about the market. In the broadest sense, a 
process of dissemination of information must be found. The right to an 
80 Cf. L. Krämer, op. cit. (note 3), paras. 63, 48. 
81 Cf. for an overall presentation of the case-law Grabitz, 'Europäisches Ver-
waltungsrecht- Gemeinschaftsrecht! iche Grundsätze des Verwaltungsverfahrens' 
N]W (1989) 1776 seq.; more specifically w ith reference to Article 30: Meier, 'Zur 
lebensmittelrechtlichen Integration der nationalen Märkte in den Gemeinsamen 
Markt' 149 ZHR(1985) 651 seq.; Rabe, 'Gegenseitige Anerkennung nationalen 
Lebensmittelrechts in der Gemeinschaft' 3 Zlll (1989) 363 seq. 
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informed decision could not only offer the consumer the opportunity to 
actively participate in market processes, it would also burden him with the 
responsibility of participation or of mere passivity. In this perspective, 
Article 30 might engender a right to participation or a right for participants, 
from which concrete requirements could be developed. Thus it would 
follow: (1) Article 30 is not only aiming at Member States and producers. 
Rather, it provides the consumer with a legally guaranteed position in 
relation to the movement of goods; (2) a role which the consumer can only 
fill if producers and Member States take the necessary precautions. To this 
end, the decisions of the ECJ, based on Article 30, show tendencies 
comparable to those in constitutional court decisions,82 by setting up a 
procedure for basic rights flowing from Article 30 and guaranreeing the 
exercise of rights. Since the Cattenom decision83 it should have become 
dear that the ECJ considers formal competence tobe a minimal requirement 
for procedural rights. However, one problem remains to be solved: the 
conclusion drawn under Article 30 cannot be transferred as such to Article 
36 since it is the Member States, and not consumers, who are the addressees. 
Procedural rights cover or should cover participation and redress. There 
is not much case-law at hand shaping the consumer's position before the 
ECJ.84 Redress is not possible against Community directives and Commu-
nity regulations. Consumers are regarded as not being directly and 
individually concerned by Community action, per Article 173.85 Directives 
and regulations are orientated towards the Member States only. The 
situation is somewhat different in competition law. 86 Article 3(2b) of Regu-
lation 1787 entitles all persons and groups of persons to require action from 
the Commission against infringements of Articles 85 and 86. Neither individ-
ual consumers nor national or consumer organisations have ever tried to 
82 BVerfGE 53, 30 seq.; cf. infra B. l. 
83 Decision ofthe EC]. 22.9.1988, Case 187/87 [1988] ECR 5013 et seq. 
IM Cf. the analysis in L. Krämer, op. cit. (note 3) 393 seq., reference should be made 
to the results of the conference tobe held in Louvain-Ia-Neuve, 22/23.10.1990 on 
group actions and the defence of the consumer interest in the European 
Community. 
85 Wenig in E.Grabitz, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Artic/e 173, Rdnr. 54-58, 
with reference to Case 246/81, [1982] ECR 2277 at 2291, n. 16 - Lord Bethell, 
denying locus standito user's organization. 
86 Cf. L. Krämer, op. cit. (note 3) 395 seq. and Crossick, 'Consumer participation in 
the E.C.Competition Decision-Making Process', in M. Goyens (ed.), EC Compe-
tition Policy and the Consumer lnterest 0985) 341 seq. 
lf1 OJ 0962) 204 seg, a comment on this fundamental regulation can be found by 
Koch in Grabitz (note 85) after Art. 87. 
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enforce ehis right to take action before the ECJ. Only in two instances have 
consumers become involved before the ECJ. Both concerned the capacity 
of all persons to join in litigation before ehe ECJ if they have a legitimate 
interest in the decision of ehe Court. Both cases concern infringements of 
Article 85. In 1973 an Italian consumer organization joined the litigation 
between ehe Italian producers of sugar and the Commission, arguing that the 
anti-competitive behaviour of the Italian manufacturers concerned Italian 
consumers.88 Tue ECJ accepted the consumer complaint and formulated as 
a basic principle that the competition rules are not only aiming at a well-
functioning of the Intemal Market, but also that they benefit the consumer. 
Tue second case dealt with attempts by the Ford Motor Company to prevent 
parallel imports from Belgium to the UK.89 BEUC, the European consumer 
association joined the litigation on the Commission's side. Here again the 
EC] followed the reasoning presented by BEUC ehat the restrictions affected 
consumers. One might assume that the ECJ has accepted the right of 
consumer organisations to represent European consumers before the ECJ. 
They are legitimated to participate in litigations before the Court. The rule 
cannot be transposed as such to the field of consumer safety. It is possible, 
however, to derive principles from the case-lawwhich could serve as a basis 
for a European policy on the role of consumer organisations in controlling 
European product safety regulations before the ECJ.90 
B. Constitutional Developments in the Member States 
From the constitutional law viewpoint trends are emerging which recog-
nize a 'right to safety' either as (1) a state objcctive in the case of Member 
States within new constitutions or as (2) a human right in the case of 
Member States with old constitutions.91 The problem today seems no 
88 Case 41, 43-48, 50, 111, 113 and 114, 11.12.1973 not published, reported in L. 
Krämer, op. cit. (note 3), 398 seq. 
89 28.2.1984, Case 228 and 229/82, [1984] ECR at 1129 
90 CT. supra IV. 3. 
91 Bull. EG, Supplement 5/1976, 'Der Schutz der Grundrechte bei der Schaffung 
und Fortentwicklung des Gemeinschaftsrechts' - Bericht der Kommission vom 
4.2.1976, dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat übermittelt - Probleme 
eines Grundrechtskataloges für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften - Studie im 
Auftrag der Kommission erstellt von Prof. Dr. Bernhardt, Direktor des Max-
Plack-Instituts für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Hei-
delberg; see also Starck, 'Europas Grundrechte im neuesten Gewand in Recht 
als Prozeß und Gefüge', in Festschrift für H. Huber (1981) 481 seq. 
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longer to concern recognition of a regulatory need for 'protection against 
health risks' by the State, but rather how to meet these regulatory needs. In 
particular, how a right to safety of this nature should be framed if it is to 
contribute to an improvement of the level of protection. Tue functional 
protectional aspects of the right to safety are in the forefront of our analysis. 
This makes it possible to ignore the status of the relationship between the 
right to safety and the right to health or physical integrity.92 Protection 
against risks covers all possible dangers, irrespective of their cause. A 
protective right to safety, whatever its constitutional form might be, can be 
concretized only through a procedure. 
Tue national consumer policy programmes of the 1970s presented 
minimum requirements thereto: they advocated an opening up of admin-
istrative procedures, and a democratization ofthe intemal decision-making 
process. 93 This demand was widely met in the area of process regulation.94 
Traditional product regulation of consumer safety relied instead on the 
legitimatory lead of national administrative activity, in part newly intro-
duced. Both concepts, however, turned out tobe insufficient. An adminis-
trative legitimation deficit has emerged, irrespective of whether or not 
consumers were involved in the administration procedure. Consequently, 
consumer policy shifted away from the level of administrative procedure, 
to the level of protection of rights. Legal redress in the form of guaranteeing 
subjective rights before the courts is now supposed to guarantee a review 
of the right to safety as found and made specific in administrative 
procedure. 
Tue unresolved tension between democratized administrative proce-
dures or those still in need of democratization, and the building up of 
protection of rights, spilled over onto the level of constitutional law. The 
issue presents two alternatives. Ought the concretization of protected rights 
be brought about through an administrative procedure defined in the 
constitution which would grant the citizen constitutionally-based rights of 
participation? Alternatively, may the affirmation of rights remain in the 
hands of the administration whose decision, in turn, would be subject to 
92 G. Robbers, Sicherheit als Menschenrecht(1987) 15. 
93 Cf. overview in N. Reich/H.-W. Micklitz, Consumer Legislation in tbe EEC-A 
Comparative Analysis(I980) 1 seq. 
94 Cf. for the distinction between process and product regulation, Brüggemeier et 
al„ Sicherheitsregulierung und EG-Integration, ZERP DP-3/84. Installations 
have to undergo a specific approval procedure=process regulation. Products 
are subject to a prior approval, prior registration or reference to standards 
procedure~product regulation. 
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constitutional review? Tue latter would require a corresponding right to 
legal redress and an organizational structure which would guarantee a right 
to be heard before the Courts for consumers. Constitutionally, this 
constitutes the option between democratizing the procedure or expanding 
legal redress, between securing the rule of law (Recbtsstaats-prinzip) by 
developing democracy or developing the rule of la w in order to guarantee 
democracy.95 
Tue widespread administrative legitimation-deficit points in the direc-
tion of expanded legal redress, with the citizen's subjective rights correcting 
the errors ofthe administrative procedure. But the constitutional dimension 
ofthe procedure is inherent in all protective rights. Especially in the case of 
the right to safety, 96 the alternative between expanding democracy through 
opening up the procedure or expanding protection ofrights by bringing the 
consumer into court proceedings, can be seen as illusory. Looked at 
properly, it can be not so much an either/ or as a both/and, the opening u p 
of administrative procedure to the public may have occured in a way which 
did not, in fact, correspond with the requirements deriving (and still tobe 
derived) from the constitution. Nevertheless, the paradigm of democratiza-
tion of a procedure versus expansion of protection of rights does seem 
helpful, because it clearly brings out the constitutional implications of 
procedural concretization of the right to safety. 
Tue different developmental trends within the Western European con-
stitutions should be studied by comparing the constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Germany with the constitution of Spain, each of which exem-
plifies a specific approach. Tue Federal Republic of Germany, though quite 
a young democracy, might be associated with a human rights approach to 
safety. Protection against health hazards is guaranteed by distinguishing the 
right to safety from individual defensive rights against government interfer-
ence. Procedural implementation of such a right is brought about through 
redress. Tue German approach might be significant because there are 
common trends in the development of the German constitution andin the 
development of the case-law of the ECJ.97 
Spain, alternatively, provides in its constitution for the protection ofthe 
95 Preuß, 'Perpektiven von Rechtstaat und Demokratie' KJ(1989) 1 seq., 12; also 
'Sicherheit durch Recht-Rationalitätsgrenzen eines Konzepts' KritV(1989) 3 seq. 
96 Cf. recently Klein, 'Grundrechtliche Schutzpflichten des Staates' N]W(1989) 
1633 seq. 
97 Op.cit. infra IV. A. 1. 
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consumer as a 'state objective' .98 This state objective needs to be concre-
tized within the legislative machinery. Attention must be paid to the process 
of shaping consumer safety law, based on the constitutional state objective 
and whether consumers have a chance to influence the process of defining 
consumer safety. One might associate the Spanish approach with the 
choice made by the European Parliament.99 Here too, consumer protection 
is formulated as a state objective only, which needs to be concretized by 
the Community organs. 
1. Protective and defensive rights to safety- German constitutional law as 
an example 
The debate on the right to safety used tobe dominated by the concept of an 
individual defensive right against government interference. Seen this way, 
the right to safety is oriented above all towards the criminal Jaw and the law 
of criminal procedure.100 Security 'against the state' is a characteristic of the 
German constitution, following the experience Of National Socialism. The 
state, including the judiciary, is bound by the fundamental rights, compli-
ance with which is supervised by the Federal Constitutional Court. This 
concept is not typical for constitutions of European Community Member 
States.101 
The German constitution explicitly recognizes a right to safety, but only 
as a right ro physicaI integrity. A departure from the tradicional formulation 
of a right to safety makes it possible to see not only protection against the 
state (security), but also protection of physical and personal integrity 
(safety) by the state, as being covered by the fundamental right. Glancing at 
the constitutions ofMember States, one may consider that the authors ofthe 
German constitution, perhaps unintentionally, 102 formulated a concept of 
the right to safety which points the way to the future. 
Although there is much consensus that protective rights differ from 
!i8 Article 51 of the Spanish Constitution. 
99 Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, op. cit. (note 20). 
100 This is still the prevailing interpretation of the Fren<:h Constitution; <:f. G. Robbers, 
op. eil. (note 92) 19. 
101 Bull. EC, op. eil. (note 91). 
102 The parliamentaryCouncil had considered induding a right to safety in the Basic 
Law, but the drafting commiuee ultimately introduced protection of physical 
integrity, without being guided thereto by a viewpoint of protective objectives 
in the sense oftoday'sdebate; on thissee (exhaustively) G. Robbers, op. cit. (note 
92) 15 seq. and G. Hermes, Das Grundrecht auf Schutz von Leben und 
Gesundheit (1987) 190 seq. 
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defensive rights, the possible content of protective rights remains un-
settled. R. Alexy defines rights to protection as 'constitutional rights to have 
the State shape and handle the legal order in relation to the conduct of 
equally placed legal subjects among themselves in a particular fashion' .103 
This definition dearly brings out the problem-laden triangular structure of 
constitutional protective rights.104 For the area of the protective rights to 
safety, two models are conceivable:105 
(1) the (defensive) preventive action of the state against interference by 
third parties and; 
(2) measures of active shaping, financial provision and censure of 
governmental institutions etc. 106 
Tue first type has been developed in a landmark decision concerning 
the punishability of abortion. The Federal Constitutional Court postulated 
a duty of the state to protect unborn life. 107 This type of protection has been 
invoked again in the question whether the victim of a political kidnapping 
is entitled to demand action protecting his life.108 But the most important 
area of concern today involves environmental hazards resulting from 
installations like nudear power plants, threats to health from noise, air 
pollution, radioactivity and other radiations. 10') This quest for a defensive-
preventive activity of the state presupposes that it is possible to identify a 
third party who may be responsible for the hazard. Cases in point are 
judgements of the Federal Constitutional Court affecting the operators of 
nuclear plants or airports. 110 These cases belong to the core of a protective 
right to safety. 
Tue approach taken cannot cope with environmental damages, attrib-
utable to a multiplicity of causes, such as the much-debated damage to 
forests (Waldschaden) or the less famous complaints of ehest illness in 
103 Tbeorieder Grundrechte(1985) 411 seq. 
l().j Cf. G. Robbers, op. cit. (note 92) 124. 
105 A survey of conceivab\e protective conflicts is offered by G. Hermes, op. cit. 
(note 102) 5-36, he distinguishes between specific interferences by private 
persons, dangers associated with legal and social contacts, environmental 
hazards and international hazardous situations. This last aspect has still to be 
examined when it comes to seeing how far non-Germans, or non-EEC citizens, 
should be able to invoke European human rights. 
lo6 Thus, G. Hermes, op. cit. (note 102) 65 with reference to the present state of 
debate. 
107 BVerfGE 39, 1 seq„ cf. G. Hermes, op. cit. (note 102) 44 seq. 
108 BVerfGE 46, 160 seq., cf. G. Hermes, op. cit. (note 102) 46 seq. 
109 Thus G. Hermes, op. cit. (note 102) 17 seq. 
110 BVerfGE 53, 30 seq. and BVerfGE 56, 54 seq. 
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children, (so-cailed 'croup coughs'), in particularly polluted districts. 111 
Parents involved had brought, on behalf of their children, a constitutional 
complaint, alleging that the Federal Government, Bundesratand Bundes-
tag bad omitted to take adequate measures against health-threatening air 
pollution. This was claimed to have infringed their fundamental right to 
physical integrity. Tue Federal Constitutional Court's Prior ReviewCommit-
tee (VorptUfangsau.sschußJ did not accept the constitutional complaint for 
decision. 112 Accordingly, German law has not yet decided the conditions 
under which the citizen may defend himself against diffuse impairments 
of the environment for which a responsible party cannot be identified. But 
the situation should be of particular interest to us, since it seems to touch 
upon a number of unsolved problems. 113 
German constitutional law provides two different options for deriving 
the essential form of administrative procedure, in order to concretize the 
protective obligation. Tue first reference point is the democratic order 
serving as a basis for development of requirements for the concretization 
of administrative procedure. This is the road to democratization ofthe law-
making procedure. lt implicitly presupposes an analogy between the 
legislative process and the administrative procedure, which seeks opportu-
nities to make the necessary concretization process transparent from the 
viewpoint of a democratic co-existence. Tue decision on procedural re-
quirements is, therefore, always one on participatory rights for citizens in 
this process of concretization. Tue other alternative considers the need to 
concretize ehe protective right from the viewpoint of the individual citizen 
affected by a decision. The assertion of his fundamental rights, his entitle-
ment to protection, is at the centre. If the fundamental right is concretized 
only through administrative procedure, this must have such a form that the 
rights do not suffer. Tue formulation of constitutional requirements on 
administrative procedure, comes about with an eye to securing and extend-
ing protection of the right on the basis of the constitutional right itself. 
Tue Federal Constitutional Court has taken the second option. lt ex-
panded protection of fundamental rights through a procedural component 
whereby the substantive content of fundamental rights protection is concre-
tized only through administrative procedure. This carried the issue of the 
111 G. Hermes, op. eil. (note 102) 46 seq. 
112 BVerfGE (Vorprüfungsausschu.ß> N]W (1983) 2931 seq. 
113 G. Hermes, op. cit. (note 102) 118-120 even wishes to confine protection to this 
situation; cf. G. Lübbe-Wolff, Die Grundrechte als Eingriffsabwehrrechte -
StrukturundReichweitederEingri.ffsdogmatikimBereichderleistungen(1988). 
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protective right to safety onto the level of constitutional law, bringing it via 
the Court into the debate on fundamental rights. Tue Mülheim-Kärlich114 
decision on Article 2 paragraph 2 of the Basic Law formulated two impor-
tant principles: provisions of administrative procedural law- in this specific 
case the licensing procedure for a nuclear power plant - may be of 
constitutional relevance; if they are relevant, they confer to the bearer of 
the fundamental right an actionable entitlement. 115 This overlap between 
procedure and rights may be a typical German approach116 tobe under-
stood against the background of the jurisprudence of the German Admin-
istrative Courts. In particular the Federal Administrative Court which does 
not ascribe any importance to citizen participation in administrative 
procedure which goes beyond mere informational assistance. The hearing 
procedure serves, we are told, exclusively to examine general views and 
is thus a means prescribed for administration in order to inform itself as fully 
114 BVerfGE 53, 30 seq. In the Mülheim-Kärlich decision the German Constitutional 
Court demonstrated an idea which can claim considerable plausibility as a 
middle range explanatory concept, suitable for generalization beyond the 
narrow German territory. The state's obligation to protect and therefore also the 
principal existence of the protective right, is said to follow from the state's co-
responsibilty for the posited cause of danger. Co-responsibility institutes the 
emergence of enforceable subjective rights to safety. The question then is where 
the state's area of responsibility begins and where itends, or to take an example, 
whether every governmental permit for an industrial plant is simultaneously an 
assumption of responsibility. There remains, finally, the issue of product safety 
regulation where a statutory responsibil ity m ight be derived from the regulation 
of market access. Statutory responsibility follows from statutory function, from 
which it would be clear that assumption of statutory responsibility is to be 
verified separately in every individual case, unless a specific definition of a state 
objective delegates to the state responsibility for protecting safety as a field of 
action. Definition of a state objective rnight fill an important lacuna here, since 
it provides the normative framework for an assumption of responsibility. 
Without this separate state objective of protecting safety, it is hard to deny the 
force of the argument which proposes that the state is not responsible for 
everything. Tue limits to the idea of responsibility can be demonstrated by the 
different force of the argument for the defensive and the protective situation. 
As long as a specific third party can be identified, allowing the state to posit a 
cause of <langer, the idea of responsibility can stand up. But in the purely 
protective Situation, no responsibility can be assigned to a third party. The 
action by parents of children with throat complaints should perhaps have been 
differently decided if a state objective of safety protection had existed. 
115 Laubinger, 'Grundrechtsschutz durch Gestaltung des Verwaltungsverfahrens', 
73 Verwaltungsarcbiv(1982) 6o seq., 73. 
116 Cf. Winter, 'Die Angst des Richters bei der Technikbewertung' ZRP(1987) 425 
seq., 427 (n. 31), referring to F. Neumann in Demokratischer und autoritärer 
Staat(1957) 20 seq. 
Consumer Rights 85 
as possible, on the factual situation necessary for a decision. 117 From this 
viewpoint, then, it is only consistent to deny protection of individual rights. 
The Federal Constitutional Court's case-law corrects this one-sided view of 
the Federal Administrative Court, but this probably does not mean that 
citizen involvement in the procedure is constitutionally conceivable only 
as participation in protecting a right. 113 
At the same time the Federal Constitutional Court has left a whole 
number of legal questions unresolved: 
- lt is unsettled which procedural provisions may be of constitutional 
relevance. The only consequence to be drawn from the wording of the 
decision would be that the licensing procedure itself, and also citizen 
involvement in the hearing procedure, is no longer at the disposal of the 
ordinary legislator. u 9 Tue licensing procedure in nuclear law would then 
be proof against a fundamental right. 120 But can it be deduced from the 
verdict that the prior approval procedure for the control of medicines and 
pesticides or even the rules on the marketing of consumer goods are 
indispensable for constitutional reasons? If that would be the case, ought 
there not tobe a call on the basis of the constitution for inclusion of citizens 
in the acceptance procedure?121 
- It is also unclear, apart from the narrow context of the judgment, 
whether detailed procedural provisions are at all derivable from the 
individual's fundamental rights. This is not even asserted by Judges Simon 
and Häusler in their dissenting opinions; 122 
- the Federal Constitutional Court does not provide any criteria 
indicating the procedural errors which give rise to legal redress, or in other 
words, which provisions are 'of relevance to fundamental rights.' 
Legal doctrine overwhelmingly accepts the Federal Constitutional 
ll7 Cf. Schmitt Glaeser, 'Die Position der Bürger als Beteiligte im Entscheidungsver-
fahren gestaltender Verwaltung', in P. Lerche, Veifahren als staats- und verwal-
tungsrecbtliche Kategorie(l984) 35 seq., 48 with reference to the case-law in n. 
31. 
118 Cf. accordingly one has to agree with Schmitt Glaeser, op. cit. (note 117), 52, 
referring to Ossenbühl in Festschrift für K.Eichenberger(1982) 183 seq. 
119 Cf. Laubinger, op. ciL (note 115) 74. 
12° Cf. Lübbe-Wolff, 'Stufen des Grundrechtsschutzes gegen Verfahrensverstöße', 
in]. Schwarze/W. Graf Vitzum (eds), Grundrechtsschutz im nationalen und 
internationalen Recbt(1983) 137 seq„ 141. 
121 For pesticides cf. E. Gur\it, Die Verwaltungsö.ffentlichkeitim Umweltrecht(l989) 
106 seq„ asserting that this consequence arises from the provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
122 BVerfGE 53, 66 seq„ concordant!y Laubinger, op. cit. (note 115) 69. 
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Court's premise that the State's duties to protect and the citizen's entitle-
ment to protection may diverge. Tue need exists, however, to itemize 
possible solutions independently of each other, and in terms of their 
interdependency. 
2. Protection of safety interests as a new 'state function': the Spanish 
approach 
Member States with new constitutions like Spain and Portugal, have 
adopted the state objective perspective, and defined it as anational goal.123 
This is true even where the wording of the pertinent rules seems to grant 
a right to protection. Tue inclusion of environment and consumer 
protection in the Spanish Constitution must be understood in the overall 
context of a former\y non-democratic social order. Whether protection 
should be secured solely through definition of a national objective or 
whether the individual should also have an actual entitlement to protec-
tion, is therefore not at the centre of the debate. Tue constitutional 
guarantee of protective rights allows the citizen to demand the democra-
tization of society. lt is against this background that the Spanish Constitu-
tion should be examined in some detail. 124 
Article 51 of the Spanish Constitution reads as follows: 
1. Los poderes publicos garantizaran la defensa de los consumidores y 
usuarios, protegiendo, mediante procedimientos eficaces, Ja seguridad, 
la salud y los legitmos intereses econ6micos de los mismos. 
2. Los poderes publicos promoveran la informaci6n y Ja educi6n de los 
consumidores y usuarios, formentaran sus organizaciones y oiran a 
estas en las cuestiones que puedan afectar a aquellos, en los terminos 
que la ley establezca. 
3. En el marco de lo dispuesto por los apartados anteriores, Ja ley 
regulara el comercio interior y el regimen de autorizaci6n de produtos 
comerciales. 
The objectives laid down in Artide 51 are not open to individual complaint. 
These are limited to the classical defensive rights against interference by 
the state, Article 53, paragraph 2. Tue legal quality of Article 51 is far from 
12~ Starck, op. cit. (note 91). 
iz.1 Cf. Gerlach, 'Die moderne Entwicklung der Privatrechtsordnung in Spanien' 85 
ZVglRWiss (1986) 247 seq., 252 seq. 
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clear. The question might be raised whether the consumer policy as 
defined under Article 51 constitutes a mere programme, or whether it 
should be understood as a state objective (Staatsziel) which binds 
parliament, the legislator and the administration. Article 51 paragraph 3 
would support an interpretation giving Article 51 the character of a state 
objective. Spanish legal doctrine draws conclusions from the legal charac-
ter of Article 51 which come close to what is understood under German 
constitutional law as 'Staatszielbestimmung. 125 Therefore the state objec-
tive of 'consumer protection' serves as a barrier to any effort by public 
powers to amend existing la w, to the detriment of the consumer. The public 
authorities are bound by the state objective, which implies that existing law 
must be interpreted so as to comply with the overall state objective of 
consumer protection. It Jikewise entitles the public powers to institute 
democratic control, wherever it is deemed tobe necessary. Tue limits and 
restraints of the state objective 'consumer protection' are found in the 
Spanish Constitution itself which provides for a democratic and social 
society, as defined under Article 1 of the constitution. 126 
Possible conflicts arising from differing state objectives, have gained 
importance in a field which highlights the specific political function of 
consumer protection in the new democracies.127 Both the central govern-
ment and the newly-established regions in Spain claim to have competence 
to regulate consumer protection, pursuant to the state objective of Article 
51. Tue conflict was brought before the Spanish Constitutional Court, 
which laid down basic rules on the division of power between the central 
government and the regions, in the field of consumer protection. These 
rules border the case-law of the European Court of Justice and of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause as interpreted by the American Supreme 
Court. 128 The central government is entitled to legitimately claim the 
competence to regulate consumer protection, as far as the rules concern 
commerce within Spain as a whole. The legislative competence on civil law 
lies in the hands of central government, the competence to regulate 
hazardous products such as medicines, pesticides, chemicals and con-
125 Cf. Sanchez, 'La tutela del Consummatore in Spagna', Rivista Trimestriale Di 
Din"tto e Procedura Civile (1986) 960 seq„ 962 seq. 
126 Gerlach, op. cit. (note 124, 251. 
127 Sanchez, op. cit. (note 125) 964; Gerlach, op. cit. (note 124) 256 seq. 
118 Cf. Jacobs/Karst, 'The "Federal" Legal Order: The USA and Europe Compared 
- A Juridicial Perspeaive', in M. Capp_elletti et al, Integration 1hrough law, 1, 
Methods, Tools and Jnstitutions (1986) 169 seq. 
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sumer goods, is divided. Market access rules must be similar all over Spain. 
Therefore the central government holds competence. The implementation 
of public law, however, is conferred to the regions. lt is all the more 
astonishing that consumer policy leads to such a far-reaching conflict 
between the central government and the regions. This decision on 
regulatory competence seems to confirm the political sensitivity of the 
regions to any interference by central government in matters which ha ve 
been, or should have been, entrusted to the regions, under the constitution 
in order to strengthen their autonomy. 
lt took eight years before Spain implemented the state objective of 
'consumer protection.' Tue first proposal dated back to 1979, but a real 
need for consumer policy was felt in Spain only after the scandal 
concerning poisonous olive oil, which led to the death or serious bodily 
injury of many consumers. The 1984 Act on consumer protection differs 
considerably from all consumer regulation in the established Western 
democracies. 129 The Act covers the whole field of consumer policy, 
economic protection as weil as protection against health hazards, con-
sumer participation and consumer redress. lt is much more a programmatic 
Act than a piece of legislation in the classical sense. The Act not only 
imposes clear legal obligations on manufacturers, but it codifies, at the 
same time, basic principles which cannot be implemented in their original 
form. That is why the legal quality of the 1984 Act has been challenged, and 
the conflict on the nature and character of Article S 1 of the Spanish 
Constitution seemed to reappear in the consumer legislation which 
implemented that Article. lt seems impossible to give a definitive answer 
as to the legal character of the Consumer Act. 
Consumer safety, though explicitly mentioned in the constitution and 
covered by the 1984 Consumer Act, is not comprehensively regulated. The 
law constitutes at its best, a legal obligation imposed on manufacturers to 
bring only safe products onto the Spanish market.130 This rule is similar to 
the Community's Draft Directive.131 All the other safety-related provisions 
under the Consumer Act constitute a mandate given to the central govern-
ment of what should be done to protect consumers against health hazards, 
rather than establishing rights and duties. This is all the more true when it 
comes to examine the role of consumers in the administrative procedure 
129 Cf. Uriane, 'The Spanish Act on the Protection of the Rights of Consumers and 
Users' B]CP(l985) 169 seq. 
130 ld., 173. 
131 Op.cit. (note 46). 
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and their capacity to challenge public decisions before the courts. Article 
51 paragraph 2 recognizes the right of consumers to be heard whenever 
a matter concerns them. Astate objective in this way, should be understood 
as an obligation irnposed on the Spanish legislator to install an appropriate 
mechanism of participation, in all measures taken to implement the policy 
objective. Tue rules on consumer representation, consurner consultation 
and consumer participation under the 1984 Act, remain incremental and do 
not seem to comply with the constitutional rnandate. They have been 
criticized for their syrnbolic character and they do not, to any degree, link 
the concretization of product safety to a specific administrative procedure 
in which consumers are integrated. m One might finally summarize that the 
state objective of 'consumer protection' allows a legitimate claim for 
installment of consumer product safety legislation and appropriate means 
to concretize the content of consumer safety, with the participation and 
consultation of consumers. Tue constitution, it should be reiterated, does 
not provide, however, for a specific consumer redress rnechanism. This 
might be granted under legislation implementing the policy objective. The 
constitution itself limits individual complaints to defensive rights against 
state interference. 
Tue different approaches of the German and the Spanish constitutions 
on the right to safety might enlighten the European Court of Justice's 
reluctance to recognize of fundamental European rights based on a com-
parison of the Member States' constitutions. 133 
C. International Conventions and International 
'Soft Law' on Product Safety 
The development of international conventions demonstrates the same 
phenomenon as the development of constitutions in the Western industri-
alized countries. With one major difference, however. Tue procedural 
concretization of a right to safety pales into insignificance. 
- On the one hand there are the 'old' international conventions on 
human rights in the classical sense. Rights granted to individuals appear as 
defensive rights only. Tue right to safety, if any, emerged only as conse-
132 Cf. Uriane, op. cit. (note 129) 176 seq. 
133 Cf. Bleckmann, 'Die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes zur 
Gemeinschaftstreue' RIW(1981) 653 seq., 654. 
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quence of development of case-law at the European Court of Human 
Rights; 
- on the other band there are the 'new' approaches, programmes and 
recommendations, which often do not obtain the quality of a legal 
convention but remain in the form of international soft law recommended 
for application only and providing for statutory responsibility to protect 
citizens against health hazards. 
Seen under an EEC perspective, two types of problerns must be kept 
in mind: (1) whether and to what extent the Community is bound by the 
Human Rights Convention,1}1 and (2) whether and to what extent interna-
tional soft law might be integrated into Community law.135 
1. Protective and defensive rights to safety the 'old international conventions' 
and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights does not provide for a right 
to safety. Article 2 paragraph 1 mentions the right to life only.136 Recent 
developments in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
however, seem to indicate that the Court is willing to accept the existence 
of protective rights.137 Two cases have been reported in which the Court 
finally accepted the statutory obligation to take appropriate action, in order 
to protect the freedom of assembly and to respect privacy.138 Tue Court did 
not refer to Article 1 but grounded its decision on a further development of 
134 Cf. Weiler, 'The European Court at a Crossroads: Community Human Rights and 
MemberStateAction', in F. Capotorti etal., (eds), Dudroitinternationalaudroit 
de l'integration - Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore (1987) 821 seq.; Weiler, 
'Eurocracy or Distrust: Same Questions Concerning The Role OfThe European 
Court Of Justice In The Protection Of Fundamental Human Rights Within The 
Legal Order Of Tue European Communities' Washington Law Review (1986) 
1103 seq. 
135 a. inter alia, Bothe, "'Soft Law" in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften', in 
FestschriftfürH.-]. Schlocbauer(1981) 761 seq.; Everling, 'Probleme atypischer 
Rechts- und Handlungsformen bei der Auslegung des Europäischen Gemein-
schaftsrechts', in R. Bieber, G. Ress (eds), Die Dynamik des Europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrechts (1987) 417 seq; Wellers and Borchardt, 'Soft Law in 
European Comrnunity Law', European Law Review (1989) 267 seq. 
136 Cf. Doehrin~, 'Zum "Recht auf Leben" aus nationaler und internationaler Sicht', 
in Festschrift für H. Mosler Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Ge-
richtsbarkeit und Menschenrechte (1983) 145 seq. 
137 Cf. G. Robbers, op. cit. (note 92), 25 seq. 
1311 EGMR 13.8.1981,EuGRZ(1981)SS9seq. anddecision n.16/1983/110, 16.3.1985 
EuGRZ 1985, 297 seq. 
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the specific rights as shaped and defined in Articles 8 and 11. One might 
understand the approach of the Court as an attempt to deviate protective 
statutory obligations in specific cases, as far as individual rights granted 
under the Convention might be interpreted in such a far-reaching sense. 
The Court, however, seems to refute any idea of accepting a general 
statutory responsibility to protect the citizens of its' signatory states. 
lt seems possible that the European Court ofHuman Rights might accept 
a right to safety if it becomes involved in a specific and appropriate case. 
Legal doctrine discusses the possibility of derogating from the Human 
Rights Convention an overall state obligation to protect individuals against 
third party intervention.139 Such a right to protection might be grounded in 
Article 5, the right to freedom and to security (safety ). This interpretation of 
Article 5 presupposes the possibility oftransforming the classical defensive 
right of Article 5 into a protective right, in the sense of securing safety against 
health hazards. This possibility has been voiced by legal doctrine. The 
overall majority, however, rejects such an interpretation of Article 5.140 lt 
restricts the right to protection to those situations in which individuals claim 
protection against interference with their physical incegrity by the state. 
Accepting protective rights necessitates the closer definition of condi-
tions under which protection may be claimed. The European Court of 
Human Rights remains quite reluctant, in its two decisions on the shaping 
of appropriate procedures, to define the core of the statutory obligation 
granting the right of assembly and the right of privacy. The Court underlines 
that states, though under an obligation to take measures, are free to choose 
between appropriate actions. The measures taken, however, must be 
effective so as to guarantee the respect of privacy.141 The decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights was based on an individual complaint. 
The linkage between the statutory obligation to protect privacy and the 
individual complaint is striking: the individual right to claim protection 
corresponds to the statutory obligation. Taking into consideration the 
development of the German case-law on the emerging right to safety, the 
139 Cf. Murswiek, 'Die Pflicht des Staates zum Schutz vor Eingriffen Dritter nach der 
Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention', in H.-J. Konrad(ed.) Grundrechts-
schutz und Verwaltungsverfahren unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Asyl-
rechts - Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz, Referate der 23. Tagung der 
wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter der Fachrichtung 'Öffentliches Recht' 22-26 
Februar 1983 in Berlin, Schriften zum öffentlichen Recht, Band 484, 213 seq. 
140 !d„ 227 with references in note 29. 
141 Cf. G. Robbers, op. cit (note 92) 25 seq. 
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European Court of Human Rights need go only one step further and it 
would confirm the position taken by the German Constitutional Court in 
its Mülbeim-Klirltcb decision.1-12 
2. State objective and 'right to safety in international conventions 
A possible development of the Human Rights Convention might be more 
successful. More definite answers on the existence of a right to safety can 
be found in the 'new' international conventions. 1 ~3 Here, finely-tuned 
objectives are formulated, although their finer details, however, are 
cumbersome. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights recognizes in Article 12 the right to physical and mental health: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health. 
2. Tue steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child: 
(b) Tue improvement of all aspects of environment and industrial 
hygiene; 
(c) Tue prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; 
(d) Tue creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service 
and medical attention in the event of sickness. 
Tue wording of Article 12 makes clear that the so-called 'right to physical 
and mental health' constitutes an obligation on the part of the signatory 
States to take appropriate action in the interests of individual citizens. lhe 
reading of Article 12 and the general obligation laid down in Article 2 
paragraph 1, 
to take steps individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
142 BVerfGE 53, 30 seq. 
143 Particular value in this respect; Rauschning, 'Ein internationales Recht auf 
Schutz der Umwelt?' in Festschrift für W. Weber(1974) 719 seq. 
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appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures. 
leave no doubt that the Convention is not self-executing and that it does 
not grant individual rights to citizens. 144 That is why the Convention, though 
in existence since 1976, cannot substantially contribute to the formulation 
of a right to safety. 
The same holds true with respect to the European Social Charter.145 Part 
1 underlines the signatory parties' willingness to employ all appropriate 
means of star:utory and bilateral policy in order to attain the prerequisites 
from which it is possible to make use ofthe right to, interalia, 'benefit from 
any measures enabling him to enjoy the highest standard of health attain-
able.' 
In a somewhat stronger and or much more concrete vein, Article 11 then 
formulates a right to the protection of health: 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection 
of health, the Contracting Party undertake, either directly or in 
cooperation with public or private organisations, to take appropriate 
measures designed tnter alia, 
1. to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health; 
2. to provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of 
health and the encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of 
health; 
3. to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases. 
The legal quality of the different rights shaped under the Social Charter is 
subject to a controversial debate in legal doctrine. 146 Some deny the self-
executing character of the Social Charter with reference to Part III. Here, 
quite concealed in the Charter, it is made clear that the signatory States 
agree on the Charter's pure international character, whose performance is 
subject only to the implementation and monitoring procedure as provided 
for in Part IV. Others do not take this argument for granted and try to solve 
the problem of the binding nature by drawing a distinction between those 
rights which are specific enough to constir:ute legal rights for individuals, 
1"°' ld., note 143, 722. 
145 ld„ note 143, 722-723. 
146 Cf. Zuleeg, 'Die innerstaatliche Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Verträge am 
Beispiel des GATI und der Europäischen Sozialcharta' ZaöRV(1975) 341 seq„ 
344 seq. 
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and those which provide a mandate for the signatory States only. Even the 
latter approach, however, would not help upgrade Article 11, as it clearly 
constitutes a state objective only, and not a right for individuals. 
Theoretically, a parallel could be drawn with the Spanish Constitution. 
Both International Conventions, however, have in common that they more 
or less set aside the question ofhow the different state objectives might be 
implemented and monitored. The Conventions escape far-reaching per-
spectives right from the beginning, by limiting the implementation and 
monitoring duties merely to the obligation of the signatory Stares to report 
an further progress.147 They da not engage themselves in taking action to 
implement the mandates adopted under the Convention. Rather, they 
neatly restrict their duty to reporting an events occuring in their countries 
within the context of the Convention. 148 
3. State objective, right to safety guidelines and recommendations 
Two international activities · should be mentioned in the context of 
regulating product safety: the efforts of the OECD to shape a consistent 
consumer policy and the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection. Both 
efforts are not directly linked to a right to safety within a constitutional 
perspective. They must be located at the level of consumer law in order to 
formulate concrete actions to be taken for protection of the consumer 
against health hazards. The OECD and UN are dealing with consumer safety 
policy rather than with consumer law. The link with the constitutional level 
is evident insofar as both international organizations recognize the exis-
tence of consumer safety as a statutory responsibility within the regulatory 
mechanisms. 
The OECD has played a key role in the formulation of a consumer safety 
policy. In 1972, a Working Party on the safety of consumer products was 
set up to deal with questions concerning all consumer products with the 
exception of food and drugs. In the same year, US Congress adopted the 
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA)which has served as a model for safety 
legislation up to the present. The United Stares used the OECD as a forum 
to push international regulation on product safety. The working pro-
m ld, note 143. 
148 Cf. in a broader context Schwarze, 'Rechtsschutz Privater bei völker-
rechts-widrigem Handeln fremder Staaten' 24 Arch VR (1986) 408 seq. who 
underlines the necessity to develop remedies for individuals under the interna-
tional public Jaw. 
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gramme of the OECD Committee relied on harmonization of international 
regulation on product safety and information exchange on emerging 
national legislation as appropriate means for protecting consumers. 149 Tue 
informal notification procedure already established in 1973 must be under-
stood as an attempt by the OECD's Committee to obtain an overview on the 
overall initiatives of Member countries for regulating product safety, with-
out taking into account the implications on global trade. The development 
of diverging national Standards has been the second major concern of the 
Committee's work. In a series of reports150 on Data Collection Systems con-
ceming product-related accidents, Severity Weighting of such Data, the 
Description of Principles and the Application of Product Safety Policy, 
Legislation in Member State Countries and ofDevelopment ofRecall Proce-
dures, the Committee tried to formulate a comprehensive concept of 
product safety regulation. These reports largely reflect the United States 
approach to safety regulation.151 They still influence the actual shaping of 
the safety policy of the Community. 
The OECD, however, has lost influence in the eighties due to the partial 
setback experienced by US policy in product safety. Recent activities of the 
OECD indicate a change in policy, namely a shift towards the Community 
approach on product safety, more specifically to the regulatory mecha-
nisms developed by the so-called 'New Approach'. Tue OECD tried to ex-
tend the New Approach to all industrialized countries and to lay down the 
basis for an international safety policy. 152 
Tue UN-Guidelines on Consumer Protection were adopted in 1985 after 
a ten-year lang debate. Health and safety is mentioned in the !ist of 'general 
principles'.153 These contain essentially a restatement of basic consumer 
rights as set out in the well-known message from President Kennedy. 
Under 'general principles' itsays: 'Governments should develop, strengthen 
1~9 Cf. Ringstedt, 'OECD, Safety and the Consumer' 9 ]CP57 seq. 
150 OECD (1978), 'Data Collection Systems related to Injuries involving Consumer 
Products'; OECD (1979), 'Severity Weighting of Data on Accidents involving 
Consumer Products'; OECD (1980), 'Safety of Consumer Products'; OECD 
(1981), 'Recall Procedures for unsafe Products sold to the public'. 
151 Cf. Ch. Joerges et al., Sicherheit von Konsumgütern, op. cit. (note 10), 201 
seq.(Report on the US Product Safety Law). 
152 OECD, Commiuee on Consumer Policy, 2 CCP (89) 31.3.1989, International 
Trade and The Consumer Interest, Possibilities for Harmonization of Product 
Safety Standards. 
153 Cf. for a general analysis Merciai, 'Consumer Protection and the United Nations' 
Journal o/ World Trade Law (1986) 2o6 seq.; Harland, 'The United Nations 
Guidelines for Consumer Protection' 10]CP(1987) 245 seq. 
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or maintain a strong consumer protection policy.' Tue legitimate needs to 
meet are: 'the protection of consumers from hazards to their health and 
safety.' Tue International Organization of Consumer Unions has tried to 
give 'health and safety' priority over all the other principles enumerated and 
has proposed a rewording of 'general principles':15'1 'the right to physical 
safety of consumers in their protection from potential dangers, which all 
countries should recognize as a basic and fundamental human right.' 
The International Organization of Consumer Unions failed and 'health 
and safety' was put on an equal footing with 'promotion and protection of 
the economic interests of consumers .. .'. Tue general principles are then 
broken down into 'guidelines' defining basic minimum standards for 
health, safety and environmental protection under two separate headings, 
'physical safety' and 'measures relating to specific areas.' Tue scope of 
'physical safety' can be defined against the more detailed section on 
'measures relating to specific areas' which deals mainly with food, water 
and pharmaceuticals. It is designed particularly for assisting developing 
countries by giving 'priority' to areas of essential concern for the health of 
the consumer, such as food, water and pharmaceuticals. Tue section on 
'physical safety' should be understood as laying down basic safety 
principles valid for every type of health and safety regulation, whereas the 
section of 'specific areas' formulates additional requirements for particular 
products. 
According to the Guidelines, 
governments should adopt or encourage the adoption of appropriate 
measures, including legal systems, safety regulations, national or 
international standards, voluntary standards and the maintenance of 
safety records to ensure that products are safe for either intended or 
normally foreseeable use. 
Appropriate policies should ensure that if manufacturers or distributors 
become aware of unforeseen hazards after products are placed on the 
market, they should notify the relevant authorities, and, where appropri-
ate, the public without delay. Governments should also consider ways 
of ensuring that consumers are properly informed of such hazards. 
Governments should, where appropriate, adopt policies under which, 
if a product is found to be seriously defective and/or to constitute a 
154 IOCU, Comments by the International Organisation of Consumers Unions, 
United Nations Draft Guidelines on Consurner Protection (1985). 
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substantial or severe hazard even when properly used, manufacturers 
and / or distributors should recall it and replace or modify it, or substitute 
another product for it. If it is not possible to do this within a reasonable 
period of time the consumer should be adequately compensated. 
Post market control covers the establishment of accident surveillance 
systems, the existence of compensation rules and mechanisms to guarantee 
that unsafe products are withdrawn from the market. Measured against the 
Guidelines, quite a number ofthe major trading nations should revise and 
tighten their safety regulations.155 The reading and philosophy behind the 
Guidelines relating to product safety is strongly influenced by the regulatory 
philosophy ofthe OECD as formulated in the seventies under the influence 
of the United States. 
Tue Guidelines and the OECD reports suffer from a major deficiency: 
they do not deal with problems of procedure. They more or less set aside 
questions of implementation and monitoring. Enforcement measures are 
only taken at an informal level, without a real mandate. Tue OECD initiates 
review investigations on the state of the legislative machinery within its 
Member countries, the UN is undertaking consultations for Latin America 
and the Caribbean to promote the application of the Guidelines.156 
V. Tue Structure of a European 
Protective Right to Safety 
Our proposals are partly based on the existing law of Member Stares or the 
Community. They are partly prospective, policy-orientated and not always 
grounded on established doctrine. The intention is to introduce future-
orientated ideas which might make a contribution to promoting the 
development of a fundamental right to consumer protection. 
155 In the same sense, cf. Merciai, op. cit. (note 153) 214-216; Harland, op. cit. (note 
153) 252-252. 
156 IOCU-Newsletter 163 (1987) May, 1. 
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A. Normative Consequences 
Tue analysis has shown that there is a common tendency to establish the 
protection of consumer safety on a constitutional basis. There is, however, 
no agreement on the ways and means to be employed. The solutions 
proposed are bound to specific socio-cultural conditions which must be 
respected when one attempts to formulate a Community protection 
scheme on consumer safety. 
1. Community responsibility for the protection of consumers against health 
hazards 
In defining the Community's responsibility for the protection of consumers 
against health hazards three distinct options present themselves. Under 
these three alternatives all the solutions discussed so far may be summa-
rized. Tue item 'responsibility' has been chosen to cover all these 
approaches as a form of collective heading: 
- a non-binding consumer programme on product safety in the Treaty; 
- a Community objective (Staatsziel) on protection of consumers against 
health hazards; 
- a right to safety, entitling the individual to claim performance of the right 
from the Community, including the opportunity for requiring the adoption 
of secondary Community rules on product safety. 
A Community responsibility on consumer safety must have binding effect. 
For this reason we would exclude the option of formulating a mere 
consumer safety programme under primary Community law. A binding 
obligation, however, can be instituted either by formulating a state 
objective (Staatszielbestimmung) or by recognizing a Community right to 
safety. Considering the pros and cons of both alternatives might assist in 
the path to finding the best European solution. 
The state objective option and the rights option share a common 
element: public responsibility and individual enforcement do not corre-
spond. Imposing a state objective on the Community which requires it to 
implement a consumer safety policy would primarily bind the Community 
organs. lt does not necessarily Iead to the guaranteeing of individual and 
enforceable rights. These rights might emerge under a state objective 
approach. Whether, and the extent to which, rights might be derogated 
from consumer safety as a state objective, depends to a large extent on the 
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precise form which the enumerated objectives take on, since it is this factor 
which determines the creation of a concrete and individual right. The rights 
option leads to the very same result. A consumer right to safety must not 
and cannot be automatically enforceable. There are additional criteria 
necessary before the overall broad right to safety can be reduced/upgraded 
to an individual enforceable right. Just like the state objective option, the 
rights option, is primarily addressed to the public powers. Despite these 
similarities attention should be drawn to certain divergencies: 
(a) Stare objectives might remain on paper, governments are not ready 
to take the proper measures. This is particularly true for state objectives 
formulated in international conventions and international 'soft law.' 
Although this <langer is less severe in legally binding national state 
objectives, the problem remains w}Jether the measures taken suffice to 
comply with the 'spirit' of the state objective; 
(b) Tue institution of rights for consumers, which are contrary to the 
classical defensive rights lacking automatic enforceability, creates consid-
erable uncertainty on the part ofthe rights-bearers. They are endowed with 
a constitutional right, but they are not told precisely under which 
circumstances they may claim the enforcement of this right to safety. What 
value does a right to safety carry which is not a right in the classical sense? 
Taking the similarities and differences of the two options into consid-
eration and accounting for the state of development at the national, 
international and the European level, we are suggesting a constitutional 
concept underwhich consumer safety is guaranteed as a European right to 
safety. This option seems to reveal more desirable and certainly more pro-
mising perspectives for European consumers than the state objective 
option. Experience shows that Courts are willing to transform classical 
defensive rights into protective rights, but they hesitate before treating state 
objectives as granting rights to individuals. A European right to safety 
imposes a public responsibility on the Community. lt can becomea remedy 
for consumers, but it does not correspond to an overall individual en-
forceable right. 
Tue institution of a European right to safety suff ers from a difficulty 
which might ultimately be an advantage. A European right cannot be 
comprehensive. lt presupposes the delegation of competence from the 
Member States to the Community. But particularly thisrestriction supplies 
a strong argument in support of the proposition which construes public 
responsibility as a constitutional right. Once the Community becomes in-
volved in consurner safety, it accepts public responsibility for the protection 
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of consumers against health hazards. The transfer of responsibility is seen 
tobe constitutive for the emergence of individual rights. Experience drawn 
from analyses of constitutional law development in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the state of safety law in the Community and the Convention on 
Human Rights, indicate the recognition of a statutory responsibility, only to 
the extent that the public powers have taken over responsibility for regulat-
ing product safety. Tue German Constitutional Court relies on the criterion 
of statutory intervention which triggers off the statutory responsibility; the 
International Court of]ustice is willing to derive a statutory obligation from 
specific individual rights, but not as an overwhelming general duty. 
The same phenomenon may be observed at the European level. Tue ECJ 
accepts Community responsibility only as far as the Community has been 
awarded competence on the regulatory issue. Having this experience in 
mind, it is clear that a European right to safety cannot be constituted as an 
all-embracing statutory responsibility for the Community to protect Euro-
pean consumers against health hazards. Tue emergence of the right is 
bound to the delegation of competence. Delegation yields responsibility 
and the adoption of responsibility indicates the existence of individual rights. 
To summarize for the sake of clarity: grounding the institution of a 
European right to safety on the transfer of competence does not mean that 
the delegation of power necessarily leads to the emergence of individual 
enforceable rights. Such a conclusion has neither been drawn by the Ger-
man Constitutional Court nor by the International Court of Justice. Criteria 
are needed to define the borderline between public responsibility and 
individual enforceable rights. This will be done when we discuss the 
possible remedies for implementing the right to safety.157 As regards the 
further development of the right to safety, it suffices to keep in mind that 
the Community right to safety imposes a public responsibility on the Com-
munity itself. 
A Community right to safety, whose emergence depends on the dele-
gation of regulatory powers to the Community, requires that the responsi-
bility granted is constituted in a way which guarantees that the level of 
Community protection does not lag behind that of the Member States. 
2. Defining safety 
A consumer right to safety obliging the Community to maintain a high level 
of protection or follow a maximization principle, might assist the provision 
157 Cf. infra C. 
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of a safety concept with an adequate weighting, in situations causing 
conflict with other fundamental rights. Nevertheless, this does not solve the 
difficulties of definition. The right to safety remains incomplete, and must 
by implication remain incomplete. lt can be legally covered only by a 
general clause which defines requirements on the safety of products and 
installations, graded according to risks. The right can be concretized using 
the idea of spheres of responsibility, which may secure validity at the legal 
level. The institution of a right to safety presupposes a balance between the 
manufacturers' and the users' viewpoint. The formula found in the Product 
Liability Directive '(safety) the consumers are entitled to expect' reflects 
these types of interests. 
3. Level of regulation 
Tue right to safety must be laid down in the Treaty itself. But there still 
remains the issue of the extent to which it is possible and feasible to supply 
a definition ofthe concept at th~ constitutional level. The indefinite nature 
of consumer safety makes us somewhat reluctant to propose the integra-
tion of a specific product safety definition in the Treaty itself. The Spanish 
Constitution might serve as a blueprint for compelling the Community 
organs to depart from a maximization principle in the regulation of 
consumer safety, a duty which may, in turn, be incorporated into the 
Treaty. 
B. Procedural Consequences 
Tue procedural consequences of the Community's responsibility on 
consumer safety remain the same whatever form the responsibility might 
take. This implies that even when one does not accept the institution of a 
right to safety, and instead prefer the state objective option, one must still 
consider the procedural consequences of the Community's responsibility. 
1. Privatization of consumer safety and statutory responsibility 
Tue delegation of regulatory power from statutory entities to private 
standard-setting institutions is constitutive for the regulation of product 
safety throughout the Community. The process is visible in the field of 
consumer goods, whereas it is less obvious whenever product regulation is 
subject to some kind of prior approval (medicines) or prior registration 
procedure (chemicals). Tue final responsibility remains, not in the hands 
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of the statutory authorities but rather in the hands of consultative 
committees, often private in nature, who pre-structure the market access 
decision. To put it simply, the public authorities do not have the capacity 
to define the level of protection themselves. They must make use of the 
competence collected in private standard-setting bodies, whatever their 
form, their legal mandate and their composition might be. Tue regulatory 
technique chosen by the Member States and the Community in product and 
process regulation may be characterized as a tendency towards privatiza-
tion which is somewhat compensated for by a process of democratization. 
This means that regulatory powers are de facto transferred to private 
entities. Tue statutory authorities, however, maintain the capacity to 
influence the standard-setting procedure and force these bodies to 
integrate public interests into their decision-making machinery. This 
perspective, though realized in the field of consumer goods where 
standard-setting is officially placed in the hands of private entities, might 
weil be expanded to administrative prior approval and prior registration 
procedures. 
Tue functional delegation of regulatory power from the Community to 
private entities encounters quite a number of problerns at the Community 
level. The ECJ has made ic clear in the Fisheries case158 .m~ !J. redelegation 
of regulatory power from the Community back to the Meinber States is 
excluded, at least in the field of the Common Commercial Policy. 
Considering these dicta, one might argue that redelegation of power to 
private entities must also be excluded. The argument could be strength-
ened with reference to the preemption doctrine. 159 
We consider that it is neither Iegally possible nor politically sound to pro-
hibit a priori the integration of private European standard-setting institu-
tions into the Community regulatory activities or put in broader terms, to in-
tegrate expert knowledge in the process of defining the level of safety pro-
tection. De facto delegation of power must, however, respect two main 
conditions: (1) the Community must take all appropriate measures to secure 
its influence on the procedure and; (2) it must likewise impose on the private 
entities a duty to open up the standard-setting procedure for public interest 
groups. 
158 Case 30nO, [1970] ECR 1197 at 1206; Case 23n5, [1975] ECR 1279. 
159 Waelbroeck, 'The Emergent Doctrine of Community Preemption, Consent and 
Re-delegation', in T. Sandalow, E. Stein (eds), Courts andFreeMarkets: Perspec-
tives from tbe United States and Europe (1982) 2, 548 seq.; more specifically, 
Lauwaars, 'The Model Directive on Technical Harmonization', in R. Bieber etal., 
op. cit. (note 38) 151 seq. 
Consumer Rights 103 
2. Tue indefiniteness of safety requirements 
Safety is not a static but rather a dynamic category. Tue appropriateness of 
precautions depends on the intensity of dangers and the category of the 
products concerned. Two types of consequences result from the quite 
specific character of product safety: 
- There is a need to grant the legislator some leeway in choosing the 
appropriate regulatory technique. Tue narrowness or broadness of this 
margin, is determined by the context which allows functional comparison 
between the mechanisms developed for the regulation of installations and 
for the regulations of products. Even if licensing of the inscallations resists 
fundamental rights, the conclusion cannot be drawn that hazardous 
products must be made subject to some kind of prior control procedure for 
constitutional reasons. The Community might delegate its competence to 
shape safety standards to private entities. H remains, however, the institu-
tion ultimately responsible for the protection of consumers against health 
risks. The Community has to retain control over the regulation ofhazardous 
products in its hands. This can be effected, according to the degree of 
potential risk, through licensing control, a registration procedure and /or 
follow-up market controls. 
- Tue indefinite nature of the content calls for the provision of procedures 
to correct and particularly tighten the control mechanism. Therefore, the 
Community's responsibility to protect consumers against health hazards 
includes the duty to provide for means which allow a critical analysis of 
the mechanisms chosen, in order to be capable of enhancing regulatory 
control (sunset-rule). An obligation to shift from reference-to-standard 
legislation to the alternative of statutory control can arise where, for 
instance, the reference-to-standard approach has been proven insufficient. 
The Community's ultimate responsibility to conduct the process of privati-
zation encompasses the corollary of providing and guaranteeing the exis-
tence of consistent post market control mechanisms which facilitate the 
taking of corrective action. There are constitutional grounds for the estab-
lishment of a Community-wide post market control mechanism. 
3. Rights to participation and information 
Tue indefiniteness and privatization requires an opening-up of the 
standard-setting procedure and in the final analysis, the administrative 
procedure as well. That is why the right to safety should include the right 
to participation. Tue citizen is not a mere information-provider for the 
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regulatory authorities but is involved in the process of defining the 
common good of 'product safety.' Citizen participation cannot remain 
limited to the procedure for licensing installations. Instead, participation 
must be guaranteed in all product control procedures, irrespective of the 
regulatory technique employed. Pleas for the constitutional introduction of 
a right to participation could be supported by reference to the Spanish 
Constitution. The Spanish Constitution expressly articulates the right to be 
heard.160 This right has been the basis for the 1984 consumer safety 
legislation by which the financing of the national consumer organizations 
has beensecured forthe first time. The case-law ofthe German Constitutional 
Court derives the right to participation directly from the right to safety, 
although there is no constitutional objective to guarantee the integration 
of public interest groups in the regulatory process. 
4. Means of concretization 
The Community right to safety must be formulated in such a way that it 
grants discretionary power to the Community to take appropriate action, 
graded by the risks concerned. lt should clearly express a Community duty 
to provide for review mechanisrns and participation of consumers; namely 
the right to participation. This Community right to safety should be coupled 
with a mandate to concretize it by way of taking appropriate measures to 
institute mechanisms for post market control and the review of existing 
safety legislation. lt equally covers the necessity to develop appropriate 
measures for the standard-setting process by which consumers must be 
integrated, independently of the function of the standards in the process of 
regulation and independently of the level at which the standards are 
developed. 
C. Remedies for Guaranteeing Enforcement 
of the Right to Safety 
Tue conferring of remedies on consumers or consumer organisations in 
order to implement a Community right to safety, is certainly the most 
sensitive issue of the whole debate on a fundamental right to consumer 
safety. Our analysis indicates the necessity of providing for some kind of 
a judicial control ofthe right to safety. Otherwise, the right to safety might 
160 Article 51. 
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remain merely theoretical. The potential bearers of such a right are difficult 
to determine. At the European level the European Parliament could play 
an imponant role. 
1. Basis of operation: arguments and objectives 
There are different arguments which mitigate the possibility of subjecting 
Community responsibility on consumer safety to judicial control, as called 
upon by individual consumers or consumer organisations: 
- the overall tendency of privatizing product safety regulation makes it 
necessary to provide for an independent control of the safety Standards 
defined and shaped within the process of standard-setting and within the 
administrative process. Expert knowledge must be open to judicial control; 
- there are structural deficits in the concept of participation. Consumers 
as weil as public interest groups can not compensate for the consequences 
of privatization, because the necessary resources are not at their disposal, 
a criterion which would be vital for compliance with the mandate given to 
them; 
- as the scope of Community responsibility and the opportunities for 
individual redress will not necessarily correspond, there might be a chance 
of compensating the overlapping competence by entrusting public interest 
groups with the enforcement of the right. 
Tue objective of making the right to safety enforceable must constitute an 
eff ort to oblige the Community to prevent possible dangers to consumers 
by taking appropriate action and compensating damages resulting from 
unsafe products and installations. Rules on the compensation for damages 
do not constitute the main problem in a right to safety. Member States' 
constitutions, as weil the Treaty of Rome, provide for the possibility of 
sueing governments as weil as the Community organs, and thereby claim 
compensation. The real problems result from insu.fficientaction and even 
more from statutory orCommunity inaction. The extent to which individual 
consumers or consumer organisations should be entitled (based on a 
European right to safety) to sue the Community for failure to act or for 
having taken insufficient action, remains unsettled. From a consumer 
perspective it would be desirable to submit all those decisions to control, 
which are taken underthe safeguard procedures. Here, a transfer of respon-
sibility from the Member States to the Community takes place. lt is at this 
point that Community consumers should be entitled to review the outcome. 
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An enforceable right of this nature must be bound to specific prerequi-
sites establishing the locus stand! of the individuals or organisations. 
Member Stares law, if existent, binds the right and its enforcement to the 
individual bearer. He or she must be subject to the threat of public inaction 
or the insufficiency of action taken. Community law grants capacity to 
individuals and organisations to sue the Community for omission to act or 
for taking insufficient action, in Article 173 and Article 175. Tue 'direct and 
individual' concern of the claimants forms the basis for their locus standt. 
This in turn constitutes the foundation for the view that individual 
consumers and consumer organisations enjoy a right to be heard, which 
corresponds to the Community's duty to enforce the right to safety on their 
behalf. 
2. Standing of individuals and consumer organisations 
There is a comprehensive set of case-law on the standing of individuals and 
organisations.161 However, it does not deal with consumers and consumer 
organisations directly. The ECJ is quite reluctant to accept individual or 
group complaints. lt tries to avoid the emergence of a group action (Popu-
Jarklagen). Legal capacity is bound to the prerequisite that those who claim 
action might be individualized and separated from those individuals or 
groups who are not concerned. This interpretation of'individual and direct 
concern' is very much in line with the jurisprudence of the German 
Constitutional Court, which links the standing of individuals to the prerequi-
site that they are threatened by concrete dangers. lt would give individuals 
and organisations capacity to sue if it is possible to separate them from the 
mass of consumers who are concerned by inaction or insufficient action.162 
Such an approach, however, would lead to the resu lt that standing might be 
guaranteed in the field of process regulation, but denied in the field of 
product regulation. Decisions concerning installations always involve a 
limited number of consumers, namely those who are living or will live near 
the installations. Risks, resulting from unsafe products, concern all consum-
ers - andin an Interna! Market- all European consumers. That is why the 
161 Cf. Winterfeld, 'Möglichkeiten der Verbesserung des individuellen Rechtss-
chutzes im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, N]W (1988) 1409 seq.; Landsittel, 
Sack, 'Dumpingsachen vor dem EuGH' NJW (1987) 2105 seq. 
162 Cf. Wenig in E. Grabitz, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Article 173, Rdnr. 
54-58. 
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mechanisms provided for under Articles 173 and 175 do not suffice to 
guarantee protection. Additional rules are needed to bridge the gap. 
There are arguments at hand promoting such a step. Consumer organi-
sations are already recognized as legitimately representing the consumer's 
interest at the European level. This has been stated by the ECJ where the 
consumer organisations' right to join competition law Iitigations was at 
issue.163 Consumer organisations, however, are participating in the defini-
tion ofthe common good of 'productsafety.' They have the right to bring the 
safety issue before the courts, if the solution found does not comply with the 
Community's responsibility. 
Community competition law provides the regulatory mechanism which 
could serve as a model for the standing of the consumer organisations 
whenever the Commission is the correct addressee for taking action. This 
would be true whenever a specific decision has to be taken under the 
safeguard procedure. Tue finer details forthe shaping ofthe procedure can 
be taken from Article 3(2)b ofRegulation n. 17.164 Consumer organisations 
would then be permitted to require action from the Commission and sue 
the lauer in case of inaction. The Jack of a regulation similar to the one on 
competition would be no argument against the standing of the organisa-
tions.165 Tue parallel with competition law fails, however, in all cases where 
the action has tobe taken by the Council as de facto legislator. 
Tue Community's pre-existing competence to take action either through 
secondary Community law or where the Community is conferred with a 
mandate in the Treaty, might be questioned. Tue regulatory mechanisms 
can be taken from Article 175 i.e., the rules on the standing of consumers 
and consumer organisations - and therefore the problems - are the same.166 
They must be directly and individually concerned with the Community's 
inaction. That the addressee of the claim differs, (i.e. the Community's Jegis-
lator), entails the necessity of examining the consumer's capacity even more 
carefully than in the case of consumer claims against the Commission. 
Though the problems are the same, their position a ppears in a different light. 
Tue procedure to be followed, however, is defined under Article 175 
paragraph II. 
163 11.12.1973, Case 41, 43- 48, 50, 111, 113 and 114/73 unpublished, cf. Krämer, 
op. cit. (note 3) 398; and 28.1.1984, Case 228 and 229/82, [19841 ECR 1129. 
i6-C OJ (1%2) 204; cf. Krämer, op. cit. (note 3), and Crossick, op. cit. (note 86). 
165 28.J.1986, Case 169/84, - Cojaz. 
166 Cf. Wohlfahrt in E. Grabitz, KommentarzumEWG-Vertrag,Article 175, Rdnr.15. 
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3. Standing of the European Parliament 
Tue EC] has recognized the European Parliament's right to sue the other 
Community organs for inacttonunder Article 175.167 One author has already 
raised the question whether the European Parliament should be entitled to 
sue the Commission, for not having respected its mandate of realizing a 
high level of consumer protection under Article lOOA paragraph III. This 
newly-introduced provision of the Treaty might be interpreted in that wa y. 
lt presupposes, however, that the Community has already taken action in 
some way or other. But this action cannot be considered as complying 
appropriately with the mandate of Article lOOA paragraph lll. Tue standing 
of the European Parliament is therefore bound to the existence of a clear 
mandate an the Community's task in implementing its responsibility on 
consumer safety. 
Tue ECJ, on the other hand, has rejected the European Parliament's right 
to sue the Community orgaf1$ for insufficient action: 168 
par ailleurs, taute personne physique au morale peut, en cas de 
meconnaissance des prerogatives du Parlement europeen, invoquer le 
moyen de violation des formes substantielles ou de violation du traite 
pour obtenir l'annulation de l'acte adopte au une declaration incidente 
d'inapplicabilite de cet acte sur la base de l'article 184 du traite. De 
meme, l'illegalite d'un acte pour atteinte portee aux prerogatives du 
Parlement europeen, peut etre soulevee devant une juridiction natio-
nale et l'acte en question faire l'objet d'un renvoi prejudiciel en ap-
preciation de validite de la Cour. 
Tue ECJ in the course of the litigation between the Parliament and the 
Council concerning the regulatory basis of the regulation an radioactive 
contamination has confirmed however the European Parliament's right to 
sue the Community organs for insufficient action in the course of the 
litigation between the Parliament and the Council convening the regulatory 
basis ofthe regulation on radioactive contamination:169 
Par consequent, le Parlementest recevable a saisir ia Cour du recoursen 
annulation dirige contre un acte du Conseil ou de la Commission, a la 
167 [1985) ECR 1515 - Verkehrspolitik. 
168 27.9.1989, Case 302/87, - Comilologie, not yet reported. 
169 Case 70/88, OJ C90, 22.5.1990, n. 27, not yet reported. 
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condition que ce recours ne tende qu 'ä la sauvegarde de ses prerogatives 
et qu'il ne se fonde que sur des moyens tires de la violation de celles-ci. 
Sans cene reserve, le recours en annulation du Parlement est soumis aux 
regles prevues par les traites pour le recours en annulation des autres 
institutions. 
Despite the change, a different approach by the ECJ would still be condi-
tional on the long term perspective of installing the Parliament as watch-dog 
for the activities ofthe Commission and the Council. No doubt this position 
could perhaps compensate for the Parliament's Jack of power. 
4. Means of concretization 
Within the framework of the Treaties, it should be possible to provide for a 
mandate which imposes on the Community the obligation to develop 
mechanisms for consumer remedies, thereby taking the competition rules 
as a model. Then consumer remedies should be delegated to the ECJ at first 
instance, just as in competition matters. 170 Such a mandate would make it 
necessary to reconsider the role of the individual and consumer organisa-
tions in the implementation of the Treaty. Effective consumer remedies 
could not be set up without amending Article 173 and its' inherent 
restriction on direct and individual concern. Tue same is true for the role 
of the Parliament. A solution, however, could be found by the ECJ. An 
amendment of the Treaty should be taken into account only if the Court 
denies the Parliament locus standi for complaints on insufficient action to 
protecting the health and safety of consumers. A step of this nature needs 
to be investigated in depth. This is not the proper place to examine the 
issue. 
17° Cf. Müller-Hruschke, 'Verbesserungen des Individualrechtsschutzes durch das 
neue Europäische Gericht Erster Instanz (EuGHI)' EuGRZ (1989) 231 seq. 
